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Despite progress overall in women’s rights, two areas where progress has halted are women’s 
representation in media and politics. Women currently make up 24% of news subjects — those 
being interviewed, reported on or otherwise shown in the news — globally (GMMP, 2015a). Why 
does half of the global population and everything they do become condensed into only a quarter of 
the information we receive? What impact can this have on the roles women aspire to take in 
societies?!
! Women’s under- and misrepresentation in media are deemed media sexism in this study. 
Media sexism may have a negative correlation with women’s political ambitions, and help to 
explain why women in contexts where they have no formal barriers to political competition still 
choose not to compete. The study at hand argues that media sexism could reduce women’s 
willingness to run both by producing sexism — reflecting women in a more passive, stereotypical 
and unpolitical reality than their actual contributions to society — and reproducing sexism, by 
acting as a societal mirror that portrays sexism already present in society.!
! The potential role of media sexism via indicators from the Global Media Monitoring Project 
are tested against the share of candidates to the lower house of parliament in this global cross-
sectional study, supplemented by a case study of media sexism and candidates in Sweden 
1979-2014. The study hypothesises that media sexism has a negative impact on the number of 
women willing to run, and therefore reduces the representativeness and efficiency of democracies 
around the world.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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3: Political ambition and women’s representation in 
politics and media!
“… women don’t participate as much as men because they can’t, 
because they won’t, or because nobody asked them” (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2003, p.102)!!
As women make up half the global population, why do they represent only 22.6% (IPU, 2016) of 
the world’s national parliaments in 2016? Gender parity is continually making headway in many 
aspects of public and private life, yet political representation appears to have reached a plateau 
long before parity has been achieved. Regional differences in women with seats in the lower house 
of parliament range from a high of 41.1% in the Nordic countries to a low of 13.5% in the Pacific 
(IPU, 2016). Scholars disagree on whether this can be explained by a lack of demand for women 
in power, or a lack of supply of women willing to take on the challenge. On both sides, a 
kaleidoscope of factors have been shown to influence the number of women in power. Yet, despite 
this knowledge, women even in relatively gender equal countries are still considerably 
underrepresented. Women are usually an equal, and sometimes larger, percentage of the 
electorate (Murray, 2008, p.484) in countries across the world, which raises the question why 
women are found to be less politically engaged than men (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). A 
functioning democracy requires consent and participation, and failing to include groups into 
representation reduces a democracy’s legitimacy (Hayes and Lawless, 2015); when a group that 
constitutes 50% of the world is not proportionally represented in democracies, this gives little hope 
to minority groups.!
! As some studies are suggesting that women win elections at comparable rates to men 
where there are no official barriers to political entry (Dolan, 2014; Lawless, 2003; Heldman and 
Wade, 2011), why would women continue to typically represent well below 50% of candidates to 
parliament even in these contexts? Variation exists not only in the share of political representatives 
that are women, but also in how many women enter political competition in the first place. Clearly, 
part of the jigsaw of women’s political underrepresentation lies in women’s lack of political 
ambition, and understanding what leads to this deficit.!
! A second area where women have not made the same level of progress as in other areas 
is media (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015). Women continue to remain under 24% of people shown 
in the news globally (GMMP, 2015a, p.8). This is an increase from 17% twenty years earlier 
(GMMP, 1995, p.10). Between 1995 and 2010 this percentage increased at a near constant rate 
(GMMP, 2010, p.vii), yet between 2010 and 2015 there was no change. The only world region to 
experience more than a 10% increase in this twenty year period is Latin America, while Africa has 
the same share of women shown in the news in 2015 as 1995 (GMMP, 2015a, p.32). Reducing the 
level of media sexism, understood in this study as both underrepresentation of women and 
misrepresentation of women through various means, has then also reached a plateau despite 
being far from gender equal.!
! This has been shown in the literature to have a serious consequence for women in politics; 
namely, media sexism’s effect in hindering women in politics from success in elections. Globally, 
only 30% of electoral candidates shown in the news are women (GMMP, 2010, p.8). Case studies 
of media portrayals of women candidates in America and elsewhere have argued the direct link 
between sexist media coverage and women's failure in political competition. In the upcoming US 
presidential election, the tirade of claims in media that candidate Hillary Clinton is corrupt, a liar, a 
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flip-flopper and more seems never-ending. However, in the Pulitzer price-winning Politifact, a fact-
checking organisation used to test the truthfulness of all the candidates, Clinton was in fact the 
most truthful of all the presidential candidates, including Bernie Sanders (Abramson, 2016). 
Despite this, out of all the presidential candidates, Clinton received the highest percentage of 
negative coverage and lowest percentage positive coverage of all candidates, including Donald 
Trump (Stein, 2016).!
! So far, the literature has not answered the question of how this impacts women before 
reaching the election. In a number of studies, Fox and Lawless (2004, 2005, 2014) study how 
political socialisation — political culture, family responsibilities, self-perceived qualifications and 
adherence to ideologically ‘women’s issues’ — negatively impact women in terms of reducing their 
nascent political ambition (potential interest leading to an actual decision to run). Research on 
sexism in society suggests that being exposed to the sexist treatment of others will impact the 
observer’s own career ambitions (Bradley-Geist et al., 2015). As the political underrepresentation 
of women can be problematised partially as a lack of willing candidates, it is imperative to 
understand if media sexism has such a bystander effect on women, stifling their political ambition.!
! As media is the primary source of information regarding political candidates and society in 
general (Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011; Rättvisaren, 2015; Women’s Media Center, 2016; Kahn, 
1994; Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009), the literature on gender and media, gender and 
elections and the intersecting literature for these concepts provides a solid argument for the 
necessity of better understanding the media sexism that distorts reality and limits democracies 
from achieving a fully representative legislature. It would be a failure within democracy to continue 
practising sexism if this artificially changes the course of our political representation. Our best 
outcomes politically may be being averted because of sexist obstacles, which would not only limit 
our adherence to basic human rights, but would lead us away from innovative solutions to social 
problems that could be better solved with a larger pool of applicants for political representation.!
! The thesis explores whether media sexism functions similarly to ambient sexism, i.e. 
observing sexism targeted at someone else impacts the bystander (Bradley-Geist et al., 2015). It 
will be tested whether the bystander effect will lead to lower levels of women candidacy to 
parliament where media sexism is high, because all women in society are bystanders to sexism 
targeted at women in media — portrayed as political candidates and otherwise — and if, as a 
result, they are less likely to see themselves as suitable for political careers. Media sexism’s 
potential impact on women’s political ambition is in grave need of exploration, because of the 
potentially undemocratic side-effect of less women candidates but also because media sexism is 
considered by some to be increasing (Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009).!!
3.1: Research aim!
The aim of this study is to find how media sexism may impact women’s political ambition. The 
research question this study aims to answer is:!!
Is there a link between media sexism and the share of female candidates to the lower 
house of parliament?!!
The concepts of media sexism and women’s political ambition have been operationalised in such a 
way that their measures are comparative across space. However, it is also considered important to 
understand how media sexism may impact women’s political ambition across time. Therefore, 
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additionally to a comparative cross-sectional analysis, a small-scale case study over time of media 
sexism and candidates to parliament in Sweden is included.!
! The theoretical argument that media functions both by mirroring gender inequality and 
perpetuating gender stereotypes is argued in the Bulgarian case study by Ibroscheva and 
Raicheva-Stover (2009). In other words, media both produces sexism and has a “role in the 
(re)production of gender norms” (Wright and Holland, 2014, p.457). This study will test if this duo-
mechanism of media sexism is the case globally. The bystander effect posits that sexism impacts 
the ambitions of those who see sexism directed at others; this study theorises that this signalling 
works in two ways. Firstly, in reproducing sexism of society, media sexism may be an obstacle in 
terms of making men and women feel that women are less suited for politics than men. Secondly, 
in producing sexism regardless of the level of gender equality of society, media sexism may portray 
women in a distorted, and less favourable for politics, way and therefore make women consider 
themselves less suitable despite reality. Although the productive and reproductive aspects of 
media sexism cannot be separated empirically, they are how the mechanism of media sexism is 
understood theoretically in this study.!!
3.2: Contribution to literature!
This study is the first cross-national quantitative study to investigate the possible link between 
media sexism and the share of candidates to parliament that are women. Most media and election 
studies, or studies into the share of women candidates, are qualitative (or mixed qualitative and 
quantitative) case studies (Murray, 2008; Kahn, 1994; Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011; Heldman et 
al., 2006; Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009; Wright and Holland, 2014; Dan and Iorgoveanu, 
2013; etc). Some studies in related fields, such as factors impacting women candidates’ success, 
are experimental (Koch, 1999; Bradley-Geist et al., 2015) or survey based (Hayes, 2011). 
However, the limitations of experimental and case studies is the difficulty in ensuring that the 
conditions in the cases selected or experiments conducted allow the results to be extrapolated to 
other settings (Koch, 1999, p.85). This study adds to two sets of literature.!
! First and foremost, the study adds to the literature on media sexism, by providing the first 
known empirical, cross-sectional study of how media sexism interplays with women’s political 
ambition. The studies discussing the link between media sexism and the motivation women have 
to enter politics are low and conducted in American settings. Scholars of media sexism and its 
relationship with women politicians tend to consider the role that media sexism has in reducing 
women candidates’ success, or in belittling their value if they succeed. This research will therefore 
add to the literature by showing whether or not media sexism has an impact that is strong enough 
to make women forgo political careers in the first place, in the first known cross-country analysis of 
this relationship.!
! Secondly, the study adds to the literature on women’s political representation. Media 
sexism as a determinant of the low supply of women candidates has not been explored, and 
factors explaining women’s lower political ambition relative to men in general is a “critical void in 
the research on women’s underrepresentation in elective office” (Fox and Lawless, 2004, p.264); 
indeed, the initial choice to run for politics is a new addition to the literature on candidate 
emergence (Fox and Lawless, 2005). Women’s political ambition has been argued to be impacted 
by socialisation and cultural, institutional and structural factors; media sexism may contribute to 
these explanations, through the reproduction role of media sexism, as well as posing an 
independent explanation, through the production role. Additionally, the bystander effect focus of the 
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study is argued not only to impact women in deciding to compete in politics, but also political 
gatekeepers deciding whether to nominate women who already are involved politically.!
! Literature in these two branches will be presented in the next section to showcase what is 
known, and where they may overlap in explanations of why women are under- and 
misrepresented. Connecting these two branches of research is done to show that as media is an 
extremely powerful actor in modern democracies, we need to better understand the possibly 
negative impact of prevailing media sexism in leading democracies away from efficient and 
representative outcomes. Following this literature review will be a methodology and presentation of 
data used. Then, an analysis of the cross-sectional data and the case study data will be conducted 
before the conclusion.!!
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4: Literature review and theoretical background!
“Press coverage of women candidates is often biased and prejudicial 
and is not better than it was in 1884. The major consequence of this 
is not what most people would expect: that should a woman run, the 
press would make it less likely for her to win. The most important 
consequence is that the press coverage makes more women less 
likely to run” (Falk, 2008, p.14)!!
Women’s political ambition and media sexism’s potential impact on it is an understudied field. 
Although the negative effects of media sexism on women’s political success is established in 
literature using case studies and experiments, the conclusions drawn focus on how voters will 
behave in response to media sexism. Some studies question if media sexism can impact whether 
women consider themselves competent to compete in politics, but the question is left unanswered 
— no study found by this author has attempted to link levels of media sexism with women’s 
political ambition empirically. Although the primary objective of this study is to contribute to the 
literature on women and media by showing how media sexism could impact women’s political 
ambition, the literature on women’s political representation is discussed because media sexism 
could add to the variation in this field as well.!
! Although the literature on media sexism and women’s descriptive representation — how 
many women are elected to parliaments (Wängnerud, 2009) — have not often been intersected, 
the theoretical expectations in this study are based on the literature surrounding a) women and 
media and specifically media portrayals of female political candidates, b) ambient, ambivalent and 
other relevant forms of sexism and c) women and elections. The following literature review will 
begin by providing the definitions of central concepts used in this study. Following this, the 
literature within these three categories will be presented to reveal the gap in the literature 
expressed in the introduction; a lack of cross-national studies on media sexism’s potential impact 
on descriptive representation that this study hopes to contribute to filling. Then, a discussion of the 
theoretical framework of this study will be introduced, by summarising some of the main 
explanatory factors that are likely reducing women’s political ambition.!!
4.1: Defining sexism, media and media sexism!
While progression in women’s rights across the globe today is higher than ever, many would argue 
that there has been a stagnation or indeed decrease in progression in especially the Western 
World the last decade or longer. It has been shown in 57 countries that sexism enables a gender 
unequal status quo to remain (Brandt, 2011). But what exactly is sexism?!
! Mills (2003) discusses how sexism is unique to each individual, and shaped by their 
interactions with others and power relations. Both in studying gender and media and gender and 
elections does social dominance theory (SDT) play a role in understanding the hierarchical 
positioning of women relative to men (Ezeifeka and Osakwe, 2013; Bradley-Geist et al., 2015; 
Glick et al., 2000; Sibley et al., 2007 and 2009; Fraser et al., 2015). SDT refers to the extent to 
which individuals prefer their societies to be organised according to hierarchies (Fraser et al., 
2015). Swim et al. (1995) discuss how ‘old fashioned’ sexism is different from ‘modern’ sexism, 
which “is characterized by the denial of continued discrimination, antagonism toward women's 
demands, and lack of support for policies designed to help women” (p.199). Gill (2011) similarly 
discusses the myriad of new forms of sexism that replace the traditional forms, and thereby make it 
more difficult for new generations of feminists to avoid including backlash into their own rhetoric. 
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Clearly, then, the concept of sexism is one that cannot easily be grasped and is constantly 
changing (Gill, 2011). For this study, the definition of sexism by UNESCO (2012) will be used:!
“Supposition, belief or assertion that one sex is superior to the other, often expressed in the 
context of traditional stereotyping of social roles on the basis of sex, with resultant 
discrimination practised against members of the supposedly inferior sex” (p.54).!
Especially in the age of internet, media itself becomes an incredibly broad concept. A majority of 
the literature focuses on traditional or ‘old’ media, while ‘new’ media is beginning to gain traction in 
more recent literature. This not only entails cyber news, but media in the form of film, video games, 
advertisement, social media and more (Edström and Mølster, 2014). Because of the data 
availability limitations of this study (discussed in the Methodology), only traditional forms of media 
will be included in this study: newspaper, television and radio media.!
! Just as with sexism, media sexism is difficult to define. Often, terms such as gendered 
media, media bias and the underrepresentation of women as the ‘problem of media’ are used 
instead of the concept media sexism. Edström and Mølster (2014) comment on the difficulty of 
defining media (what is included and what is not), and the different views on the definition of 
gender equality from qualitative (equal opportunities to shape society) and quantitative (equal 
distribution between men and women) points of view that must be considered when analysing 
gender in media. This thesis defines media sexism, with consideration to the issues of gender in 
media and the patterns of discrimination identified in the literature, as follows:!
Media sexism is the mis- and underrepresentation of women (or all non-males) in 
media, creating a false portrayal of society via a gendered lens.!
This gendered lens is skewed by: an underrepresentation of women overall; gender stereotyping in 
the content of media; double standards whereby women in the news are valued for appearance, 
family status, age and more, and need to prove their viability in other contexts, whereas men are/
do not; a misidentification of women as unsuitable for the public (and therefore political) sphere 
regardless of gender equality policies. As discussed by the Global Media Monitoring Project 
(2010), women are more likely than men to be represented as students and homemakers in media, 
while in all other professions, men are more likely to be represented. These differences cannot 
simply be explained by the media mirroring the composition of societies. For example, the share of 
news subjects portrayed in Swedish media as politicians that are women is 19% (GMMP, 2010, p.
76); the share of women with seats in parliament is 44% (IPU, 2015) and 12 of the 23 ministers in 
Swedish government are women (Regeringskansliet, 2016). The following sections will explain 
how the literature so far has problematised media sexism, the focus on effects of media sexism 
and the lack of explanations of variations in it.!!
4.2: Women and media!
The literature on women and media is newer than the literature on women and elections, and can 
be characterised by national case studies using content analysis or experiments. This section will 
explain the logic of counting in the literature, and discuss the variation in media sexism. Then, the 
case studies that show the negative effects of media sexism on women’s political success will be 
presented. Finally, the mechanisms through which media sexism works in the literature will be 
identified with reference to media framing theories and mediatisation.!!
STRESSING COUNTING!
Similar to the argument of the politics of presence, the politics of representation is a growing theme 
in media and gender research (GMMP, 2010). The literature on gender and media is ever-growing, 
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and tends to focus on counting heads in order to understand media sexism (Kahn and Goldenberg, 
1991; Vos, 2013; GMMP, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015a; Mathews, 2007; Edström and 
Jacobsson, 2015; Rättvisaren, 2015). The theoretical reasons for doing so are well-argued as a 
way to empirically show that women are indeed still undervalued in media content, and is 
summarised as follows by Edström and Jacobsson (2015):!
“the symbolism the systematic underrepresentation of women in news media reveals: that 
women’s realities, thoughts, worlds and conditions are still not fully counted in society … 
When this media continually undervalues women’s opinions, thoughts and actions, this is in 
danger of being a restraining force that does not promote a democratic, sustainable and fair 
societal development … men continue to dominate news media. That is why we continue to 
count.” (p.9 [self-translation])!
The importance of understanding the impact of sexism in media through counting and 
underrepresentation is implied by the attention media coverage warrants in election observation. 
Election monitors, including the OSCE and the EU Election Observation Mission, often provide a 
media monitoring report alongside the election reports. For example, when reporting on the low 
success rate of women parliamentary candidates in the 2002 election in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the OSCE attributed this firstly to their low position on party lists and secondly to the fact that “the 
media coverage of women candidates was extremely poor: only 3% of the airtime on television and 
1% for print media space was allocated to women candidates” (OSCE, 2003, p.18). The negative 
impact of media sexism on women in politics appears to be widely acknowledged.!
! Despite methodologies often focusing on underrepresentation, misrepresentation in media 
is not ignored. Aspects such as: women being shown as victims, full body photographs rather than 
head-shots, in specific contexts such as homemaker more than men (GMMP, 2010), a focus on 
viability of female candidates but on policy positions of male candidates (Kahn and Goldenberg,
1991), tacit reference to the sex and other personal attributes of female candidates that did not 
occur for male competitors (Ross and Comrie, 2012) and more (Heldman and Wade, 2011; 
Bromander, 2012; Edström and Mølster, 2014) can be found in the literature.!
! Variation in levels of media sexism is not a point that is stressed in the literature. As it is still 
a growing field, and is lacking in comparative studies, the focus overall in the literature is 
understanding the effects of media sexism rather than variation. However, several noteworthy 
comparative case studies have been conducted. For example, Carlin and Winfrey (2009) compare 
the media portrayals of Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton and find that despite variations in how 
media sexism was used (for example, Palin being hyper-sexualised while Clinton was demonised 
for not trying to be appealing), both cases showed that media sexism strengthens the glass ceiling 
for women politicians. Falk (2008) compares the presidential campaigns of selected female 
candidates in America from 1872 to 2004 not only over time but against a comparable male 
candidate, but the overall (and disappointing) message is that media sexism has not varied over 
time. Newer studies point to the necessity for the literature to better understand variation in 
gendered media (Hayes and Lawless, 2015).!
! This variation clearly exists: within case studies based in American media and politics, the 
majority find that media sexism does have a negative impact on women candidates and politicians, 
while a handful of studies based on similar methodologies and samples find that men and women 
were treated the same by media (Lavery, 2013; Smith, 1997) or that differential media treatments 
had no impact on candidates (Hayes and Lawless, 2015). These studies would suggest that media 
sexism has greatly reduced over time, but the single case study format is not convincing, 
especially in light of the results found by Falk (2008). As the literature is composed mainly of case 
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studies, mainly in America, there has been no way to empirically test national explanations for 
variation in media sexism so far. However, even sub-national factors to explain variation are not 
stressed in the literature. !!
MEDIA SEXISM AND THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN POLITICAL CANDIDATES!
There are several scholars showing the impact of media on the success of female candidates. 
Heldman and Wade (2011) show a connection between female objectification in the media and not 
only the inability of the US to reach gender equality in political representation, but directly linking it 
to the failure of female candidates. The literature tends to focus on the traditional media mediums 
of newspapers, periodicals and television news. For example, Lavery (2013) examines whether 
there is gender bias of local television news in covering candidates for the lower house in the US 
and Vos (2013) finds that women politicians in Flanders are given less television coverage than 
men. Kahn (1994) studies the newspaper coverage of campaigns for state office between 1982-8 
and finds that media bias against women candidates existed and could get in the way of women’s 
electoral success. Wasburn and Wasburn (2011) use the magazines Time and Newsweek to 
conduct a content analysis on media coverage of Sarah Palin. However, the Global Media 
Monitoring Project (2010) finds that “the underrepresentation of women in traditional news media 
has been carried over into the virtual news world” (p.x).!
! Typically, the literature in this category consists of case studies that either establish that 
media sexism was present in the case, or that it directly impacted the candidates’ chance of 
success. Wasburn and Wasburn (2011) study the case of Sarah Palin’s vice presidential campaign 
via studying the “patterns of gendered reporting that have … dissuaded women from entering 
politics” (p.1027). They identify five patterns: women candidates receive proportionally less 
coverage than male candidates; stories on female more than male candidates focus on aspects 
such as appearance and family; female candidates are more likely to be trivialised and scrutinised 
in terms of their competence; their policy positions in women’s issues will be focused on whether 
this is the policy area they stand on or not; the potential influence a female candidate would have if 
she won is questioned. The only comprehensive survey of potential candidates in America indeed 
finds several of these areas (such as concern about balancing political and familial responsibilities 
and being credible as a candidate) explain why women are reluctant to pursue political careers 
(Fox and Lawless, 2004, p.265).!
! Others identify similar media sexism patterns (Lawless, 2003; Kahn, 1994; Carlin and 
Winfrey, 2009; Dan and Iorgoveanu, 2013; Anderson et al., 2011). Heldman et al. (2006) find that 
Elizabeth Dole’s 2000 campaign for president of the United States was negatively impacted by the 
media giving her less coverage than male candidates that had much lower public support, referring 
repeatedly to an interview where her husband questions her chances of success and more. 
Bromander’s (2012) cross-sectional study of politicians in Sweden found women to be punished 
more harshly during scandals, both in that their scandal is covered more thoroughly and that they 
are held to higher standards — similar conclusions are reached by Larris and Maggio (2012) and 
Wright and Holland (2014). Anderson et al. (2011) find that the media coverage of Liberian 
president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf made her seem like a political novelty in comparison to her 
competitor, despite her considerable experience in the field far outweighing his as a retired 
footballer.!
! Although it has been empirically shown that women candidates can have an easier time 
attaining campaign contributions in America (Political Parity, 2015), the media often undermines 
female candidates by stating that they will have little actual power to produce results or get funding 
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(Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011, p.1028; Stout and Kline, 2011, p.499), and therefore create a false 
reality wherein women candidates do not have funding and should not receive further funding — a 
prime example of the production of sexism by media. In the case of Elizabeth Dole’s presidential 
candidacy, the media repeatedly stated that she was not going to be able to fundraise sufficiently, 
despite the fact that she at the time had raised comparable funds to other candidates, and this 
coverage hampered her ability to attain more fundraising (Heldman et al., 2006). Lithgow (2000) 
shows how media sexism has not decreased in Asia, despite women having attained presidency 
more in Asia than any other continent by 2000. This suggests that media sexism against female 
politicians is not only a global issue, but one that does not go away when women are established 
in politics.!
! On its own, media can be an equalising tool: “media—particularly internet and web-based 
technologies—can teach civic skills, bolster future civic engagement and efficacy, and increase 
youth political interest and voter turnout” (Fox and Lawless, 2014, p.504). As mentioned there are 
some studies that find media sexism to be decreasing. However, even if some candidates in more 
recent elections, and in relatively gender equal societies, have not been subjected to sexist 
portrayals in media, this does not mean that a) all candidates in these countries are treated with 
gender neutrality by media, b) candidates in countries where media case studies are not typically 
conducted are similarly experiencing lower levels of media sexism or c) media in general is not still 
sexist — it is likely that all media, not just political media, is influential in shaping the world view of 
media consumers and thereby potentially impacting the level of political ambition among women.!!
THE MECHANISMS OF MEDIA SEXISM!
Mechanisms to understand media sexism fall into several categories that can be better understood 
through theories in media literature. The first is ‘media bias theory’. This theory is used by Lavery 
(2013) and states that media frames candidates in different ways according to gender, as well as 
ignoring and presenting data to the public in gendered ways (Lavery, 2013, p.878). The second is 
the ‘gendered mediation thesis’. Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover (2009) explain this to mean that 
the media agenda is male-driven and gives privilege to male-as-norm within politics. Wright and 
Holland (2014) argue that the media was a gendered mediator when covering the famous speech 
by Australian former prime minister Julia Gillard in response to sexism she had been subject to, by 
framing the speech as an emotional, strategic and hypocritical attack rather than defence. 
Referring to media as a gendered mediator, Wright and Holland (2014) mean that certain roles are 
expected of people based on gender, and media puts women in a double bind as they must 
choose between acting in the feminine way they are expected to and portraying the ‘masculine’ 
trait of powerfulness (p.456). This study argues that media frames women in this manner both by 
reproducing norms seen in society, but also by (intentionally or not) producing gendered norms.!
! Thirdly, the theory of mediatisation refers to how “media impacts the power distribution in 
society because the actors in society, to increasing degrees — both individual people and 
institutions — adapt themselves to the media’s way of working and thinking, and the conditions 
media sets” (Asp, 2011, p.151 [self-translation]). According to Schlehofer et al. (2011), the agenda-
setting power of media can be linked to evaluations of political women. Aalberg and Strömbäck 
(2011) use mediatisation theory to argue the importance of media for politicians, and find that 
women MPs in Sweden and Norway are less willing or able to adapt to media logic, and therefore 
are under and misrepresented in media. Together, these three theories paint a picture whereby not 
only does media favour the existing hierarchy of society in deciding what is salient to the public 
and who should be shown in what way, it also has concrete impact on the development of society 
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and politics. It could then be argued that patriarchal forces within society, that ensure sexism of 
media exists, will by default contribute to a cycle whereby the barriers broken to allow women into 
the public sphere are undermined and society becomes less questioning of sexism.!
! With these three theories and the case studies discussed in mind, the main mechanisms 
identified in the literature can be summarised as follows. Media has the power to shape our 
realities and world views. Media can mirror sexism in society, by for example showing less women 
in the news categories where women are underrepresented in real life, and thereby strengthen the 
norms and values that exclude women from these roles. In democracies with women’s rights 
legally upheld, this could limit women’s ability to move past social barriers. Media can be sticky 
(GMMP, 2010), and continue to portray lower numbers of women in political and other public roles 
in society than is actually the case, reducing their visibility and therefore potential success in 
elections. By showing objectifying, stereotypical versions of women, media can signal that women 
and traditionally female characteristics are less suitable for politics, reducing voter’s confidence in 
women. Eventually, politicians needing to adhere to media logic may also mean that political 
decisions are based on media framing that undervalues women candidates.!!
4.3: Relevant forms of sexism!
Glick and Fiske (1996) “view sexism as a multidimensional construct that encompasses two sets of 
sexist attitudes: hostile and benevolent sexism” (p.491). Through the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, 
Glick and Fiske (1996) argue that sexism can emerge as ambivalence towards women. On the one 
hand, benevolent sexism is “a set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms of 
viewing women stereotypically and in restricted roles but that are subjectively positive … and also 
tend to elicit behaviors typically categorized as prosocial (e.g., helping) or intimacy-seeking” (Glick 
and Fiske, 1996, p.491). On the other hand, hostile sexism is the traditional understanding of 
sexism as antipathy. This ambivalence has become an intrinsic part of sexism research, being 
used by Sibley et al. (2009), Fraser et al. (2015), Good and Rudman (2010), Bradley-Geist et al. 
(2015), Brandt (2011), Schlehofer et al. (2011), Fox et al. (2015). When analysing the impact 
sexism has on women candidates, it must be considered that different types of sexism can have 
different effects. Fraser et al. (2015) explain how benevolent sexism may help women in the short 
term but in the long term reinforces the idea that they are not suitable for certain roles in society. 
Sibley et al. (2009) note how benevolent sexism over time can reinforce hostile sexism against 
women. The interaction of benevolent and hostile sexism can be seen in media also, and is likely 
to be crucial in understanding media sexism in legally gender equal societies.!
! Bradley-Geist et al. (2015) conduct an experiment with the findings that observing sexism, 
i.e. themselves experiencing ambient sexism (p.29), decreases the career aspirations and self-
esteem of the bystander, and that women are more affected by the bystander effect than men. 
Ambient sexism describes an indirect experience whereby sexism exists in an environment and 
individuals within this environment are negatively affected despite not being targeted directly by the 
sexism (Fox et al., 2015). Examples of arguments with similar logic are rife in the literature. 
Wasburn and Wasburn (2011) discuss how women can be discouraged from becoming political 
candidates when they see current women candidates appearing disproportionately often in 
photographs. An article by Fuller (2008) discusses the direct impact the sexism of the 2008 US 
presidential election had on ‘millennial' women, interviewing women in their early and mid-twenties 
who state that the sexism they witnessed in the campaign media has made them consider to a 
larger degree how their own options and ambitions must be balanced by sexist backlash. The 
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bystander effect suggests that women who might otherwise have considered political candidacy 
who observe sexism targeting women in media may be less likely to aspire to a political career.!!
4.4: Women and elections!
Women’s political representation is a more developed research area, and this section will focus 
only on the aspects of variation in underrepresentation that interplay with political ambition and 
media. Despite the majority of countries in the world legally allowing women to vote and stand for 
elections (Womensuffrage.org, 2015), the extensive literature on women’s descriptive and 
substantive representation shows that there are other obstacles. The amount of women 
representatives that are elected is a focus of most international organisations that study women’s 
equality (African Development Bank Group, 2015; European Institute for Gender Equality, 2015; 
Social Watch, 2008; UNDP.org, 2015), and many studies theorise on the effects the number of 
women in elected positions have on societies (Ashe and Stewart, 2012; Wängnerud and Sundell, 
2012; Towns, 2008; Wängnerud, 2000) as well as what societal factors are preventing the number 
of women from increasing (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014; Stout and Kline, 2011; Dolan, 2010). 
As this study is on a cross-national scale, selected national level factors will be focused on, 
namely: the potential effects of sex stereotypes, social and political institutions, electoral systems 
and supply and demand theories on the underrepresentation of women.!
! Despite finding that the way men are covered by the media leads to a more positive 
response from voters, Kahn (1992) finds that sex stereotypes are favourable for women, as they 
appear more compassionate and honest. Sex stereotypes are found to be positive for women in 
terms of their social issues stances and leadership but negative for competence (Koch, 1999). 
Wasburn and Wasburn (2011) agree that while sex stereotypes can favour women, these same 
positive stereotypes can alienate voters, and the focus on female candidates’ personality and other 
traits shadows their policy positions. “Even though stereotypes of women contain many positive 
traits, the positive traits relate to social-emotional, not agentic dimensions, so women are portrayed 
as being nice but incompetent at many important tasks” (Glick and Fiske, 1996, p.492). Many in 
the literature find that sex stereotypes can have an impact on representation, but that it does not 
necessarily have an impact (Dolan, 2010 and 2014; Hayes, 2011). It is therefore unclear how 
stereotyping will impact women’s success as candidates, and the literature does not directly 
question how sex stereotypes will impact their willingness to run.!
! Many scholars theorise about institutional factors to explain why women are still at a 
disadvantage in elections despite their country accepting women candidates for decades, 
sometimes over a hundred years (Womensuffrage.org, 2015). Among the theories are that 
corruption over the long term leads to an exclusion of those not within corrupt networks — women 
politicians — causing them to suffer in terms of representation (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014). 
Other sociocultural institutions, such as nationalism (Towns et al., 2014) and ethnic patronage 
(Arriola and Johnson, 2013), can reinforce traditional gender roles that counteract gender equality 
legislation. Women are not encouraged to run for office nor do they view themselves as qualified 
compared to equally qualified men (Fox and Lawless, 2004). Often, political gatekeepers are 
explained to be a central part of the problem (Hayes and Lawless, 2015; Cheng and Tavits, 2011), 
and necessary agents of change in order for the status quo (the male norm) to change (Fox and 
Lawless, 2014). Gatekeepers can also be seen as a main obstacle that electoral gender quotas 
can help women overcome (Dahlerup et al., 2013). Inglehart and Norris (2003) discuss how the 
structural, institutional and cultural barriers to women entering politics together can explain 
women’s stagnation in political representation, although others argue that institutional theories 
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alone are not sufficient for understanding political ambition (Fox and lawless, 2004). Inglehart and 
Norris explain that structural barriers, such as low development, hinder women from leaving 
traditional roles in favour of political careers. Political culture keeps the male norm from being 
overcome. Political institutions entail that the “rules of the game … explain systematic differences 
in women’s representation across relatively similar types of society” (p.132).!
! Among these political institutions is electoral systems. Dahlerup et al. (2013) explain how 
women’s chances differ depending on electoral system, which interacts with electoral gender 
quotas (such as how long it takes until quotas bring about the desired effect). Overall, the authors 
argue that “systems with large district magnitudes (those using multi-member districts) give parties 
the ability to present a more balanced list of candidates, in which women and men need not 
compete for a single post in the nomination process within a party” (Dahlerup et al., 2013, p.22). 
Wängnerud (2009) reinforces this statement: “One of the most stable results in empirical research 
is that the election of women is favored by electoral systems with party lists, proportional 
representation (PR), and large district magnitudes” (p.54). Cheng and Tavits (2011) discuss the 
difficulty Canadian female candidates can have, because their single-member district plurality 
electoral system means that nominating candidates is a “zero-sum game: if a woman is nominated, 
there is no possibility of nominating a man and vice versa” (p.463).!
! Women’s political underrepresentation is often problematised as a supply and demand 
issue, where supply refers to how willing women are to enter (Norris, 1993; Ashe and Stewart, 
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Note: Of all countries with data collected in this study, these countries had elections in 2015 and the graph 
shows the share of all candidates that were women.
2012; Arriola and Johnson, 2013). When explaining the low supply of women candidates in 
candidate emergence literature, a number of factors are typically suggested, such as incumbency 
advantage and few women in positions that make them eligible to candidacy, but women’s lack of 
confidence in their eligibility despite qualifications is quickly becoming an obvious determinant (Fox 
and Lawless, 2004). Some argue that the male-centred political atmosphere and political 
socialisation dampen women’s ambitions (Fox and Lawless, 2014; Ezeifeka and Osakwe, 2013), 
suggesting the overwhelming male norm of politics needs to change before women will be fully 
able to join. Many studies rigidly argue either for supply or demand: Ashe and Stewart (2012) in a 
case study on British Columbia, Canada find that women’s underrepresentation was solely 
attributable to demand-side discrimination. However, corruption has been found to be a factor 
impacting the relationship both on the demand and supply side, blurring the distinction (Sundström 
and Wängnerud, 2014).!
! This study believes that media sexism is a factor mainly contributing to women’s lack of 
political ambition, and therefore would have a greater impact on supply. This is because of studies 
finding that relatively gender equal countries do not vote according to gender bias (Hayes, 2011; 
Dolan, 2014). Potential women candidates may be put off political careers not only because of the 
obstacles to success seen in the literature described in this section, but also because of the 
bystander effect of media sexism, portraying women in political roles negatively or not portraying 
them at all. However, demand may be reduced by media sexism as well: gatekeepers affected by 
negative portrayals of women candidates may be less likely to seek women out and nominate 
women candidates. Therefore, both supply and demand of women in politics are potentially 
impacted by media sexism. !!
4.5: Where media sexism fits into the puzzle!
Media sexism and women’s political ambition may be an important piece of the puzzle in 
understanding why almost all democracies around the world at different stages of development 
and enforcement of women’s rights experience low political representation of women. Media’s 
representation of women is undoubtedly sexist. This has been shown time and again to limit the 
success female candidates have, without any studies testing if women are less likely to aspire to 
politics as a result. The bystander effect shows that career aspirations are negatively impacted by 
seeing sexism targeted at others; media, especially in the age of internet, is a way to showcase 
sexism to the world, and this study will test if women’s political ambition is impacted by this.!
! Several factors have been successfully shown to contribute to women’s political 
underrepresentation: corruption, electoral system, level of development, societal norms, structural, 
cultural and institutional barriers. It is not the aim of this study to suggest that media sexism would 
operate as a deterrent to women’s political ambitions as strongly as these established factors limit 
their success. It is argued that media sexism acts partially as a conveyor of these factors. When 
gender unequal realities are revealed by the content of media, by for example overwhelmingly 
choosing to quote male experts, this may reinforce and strengthen these realities. In this capacity, 
media sexism reproduces sexism of other forms. However, it is argued that on top of the 
reproduction role, media sexism may have an independently produced impact on women’s political 
ambition. The case studies on women in media show a distortion of reality, by making women 
seem less capable and less impactful than they are, overtime leading to their reduced influence as 
women absorb the information they receive and alter their long term behaviour accordingly. 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5: Methodology!!
5.1: Research design!
In order to answer the research question, four hypotheses are considered against the null of no 
relationship between media sexism and women candidates:!!
Hypothesis 1: As media sexism increases, the share of women candidates decreases!!
This study proposes that media sexism could act differently from how literature has problematised 
other types of sexism, by being stronger as a deterrent to women’s political ambition in contexts 
where official barriers to political entry are lower. Therefore, the independent variable of media 
sexism is interacted with development and women’s rights variables. !!
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between media sexism and the share of women 
candidates will be stronger where women’s rights are high!!
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between media sexism and the share of women 
candidates will be stronger where development is high!!
A number of data collection restrictions prevent the analysis from including a time-series aspect. 
Firstly, the Global Media Monitoring Project only has the selected media sexism indicators 
published in 2005 and 2010. Secondly, there is no time series dataset on the share of candidates 
by gender. Thirdly, different time periods between elections globally means it is difficult to match 
changes in candidacy over time with changes in media sexism. However, as a time component 
would significantly improve claims of causality, a small-scale case study of Sweden will be 
conducted. This case study is highly concentrated and includes only newspaper media regarding 
government ministers, members of parliament and political candidates. The case study is not a 
regression analysis but rather a precursor into the possibility of lagged effects of media sexism.!!
Hypothesis 4: In Sweden, the level of media sexism in one electoral period will be 
correlated with the share of women candidates in the next electoral period!!
The global cross-sectional analysis is the main contribution of this study. It is an Ordinary Least 
Squares regression, where the dependent variable is the share of women candidates to parliament 
and the independent variable, media sexism, has seven measures tested in three sets of models. 
In the first set, the seven separate indicators of media sexism are tested in bivariate and 
multivariate models against the dependent variable. In the second set, the independent variable is 
interacted with women’s rights and in the third, development. This section begins by explaining the 
decision to not combine media sexism indicators into one index and to test interaction models. 
Then, a description of all variables will be given; the dependent and independent variables are also 
evaluated. The power and limitations of the study is discussed before the case study is explained.!!
SEVEN MEDIA SEXISM INDICATORS!
There are two main reasons for not combining the media sexism indicators into one index, both of 
which would undermine construct validity. Firstly, the possibility of the different indicators having 
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different relationships with the dependent variable. Secondly, a desire to not dilute results by 
allowing high media sexism of one indicator to be masked by medium or low media sexism of the 
other indicators. An abstract concept requires construct validity in order to be meaningfully 
measured (Popescu, 2011; Thomas, 2010; Adcock and Collier, 2001; Carmines and Zeller, 1979). 
If indicators included in an index relate in different ways to relevant variables, such as the 
dependent variable and control variables selected, then the index created will not have construct 
validity (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). A lack of construct validity is a valid concern, used to critique 
established indices like the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (Thomas, 2010).!
! An example of why construct validity may be a concern for an index of the media sexism 
indicators presented below can be seen by indicators 1) and 6). 1) gives the share of all news 
subjects that are women: as seen in the literature review, the more women are seen in the news, 
the better. The dummy variable 6) measures whether women news subjects are more likely to be 
shown in photographs while male news subjects are more likely not to be shown in photographs: 
when women are disproportionately shown in photographs, this makes them appear less serious 
and devalues their cognitive skills. When 6) shows that women are disproportionately shown in 
photos, it may occur simultaneously as women overall are being shown more in the news — 
indeed, the desire to sell papers could make newspapers favour women news subjects in order to 
use their image (Murray, 2008). Including both 1) and 6) in one index will therefore not properly 
display media sexism.!!
INTERACTION MODELS!
The relationship between media sexism and women’s political ambition does not exist in a vacuum. 
Sibley et al. (2007) interact their measure of sexism with right wing authoritarian values, finding 
that being high in right wing authoritarianism meant that sexism in one time period had a stronger 
impact on sexism in the next. Brandt (2011) finds that “sexism is more prevalent in countries that 
are less developed and have more gender inequality” (p.1416). However, this study assumes that 
media sexism specifically will be less of a deterrent to a political career if there are stronger 
deterrents in society. In other words, where women’s rights and development are low, there are 
many strong deterrents in society that make women unlikely to consider political careers. In these 
countries, media sexism will be relatively unimportant in impacting women’s political ambition. In 
countries without official barriers to women’s political entry, the media could be one institution that 
does not change, and media sexism may impact women’s political ambition. This study therefore 
finds it necessary to consider the possibility that media sexism’s impact on women’s political 
ambition is stronger where women’s rights and development is high.!
! The following formulas explain the bivariate models in the three sets that will be analysed:!!
Set A:! ! Sh_Wo_Can=a+b1MS+e!
Set B:! ! Sh_Wo_Can=a+b1MS+b2Z1+b3(MS)(Z1)+e!
Set C:! ! Sh_Wo_Can=a+b1MS+b2Z2+b3(MS)(Z2)+e!!
where: Sh_Wo_Can=the dependent variable of the share of women candidates to parliament; 
MS=the independent variable of indicators of media sexism; Z1=an interaction variable measuring 
women’s rights; Z2=an interaction variable measuring development.!!
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5.2: Operationalisation, selection and evaluation of variables !1
MEDIA SEXISM!
The patterns of media sexism discussed in the literature review are what the ideal study would 
compare cross-nationally. However, the only relevant global media sexism data produced in the 
world is the Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP). The GMMP has been producing data once 
every five years since 1995, the most recent one in 2015. GMMP is a project that aims to improve 
ethical journalism and promote equality (GMMP, 2010). Although not all media sexism patterns are 
measured by GMMP, the following seven indicators from the 2010 GMMP report, which includes 
observations from 108 countries globally, are used :!2
1) the share of all news subjects that are women!
2) the share of all news subjects in the topic area of politics and government that are women!
3) the share of all news subjects in the occupational group of politician that are women!
4) the share of all news subjects portrayed in the function of expert that are women!
5) the difference between the share of all news subjects mentioned by family status that are 
women minus men!
6) a dummy variable for whether women are more likely to be shown in newspaper 
photographs and men are not more likely to be shown in photographs!
7) the difference between the share of all stories that reinforce gender stereotypes minus 
challenge them!
! The GMMP reports recruit nationally located coders, trained in the coding guidelines, to 
code one specific day of news in their country — the 2010 report shows results for news on the 
10th of November 2009, a day chosen because any world event that may skew countries’ results 
could be taken into account (GMMP, 2010). Countries’ codings are weighted to account for country 
and population size (GMMP, 2010, p.61). For this study, the 2010 report is used because media 
sexism is the independent variable and as such should not be collected after the dependent 
variable — as the dependent variable is based on election years, not enough elections would have 
occurred following the 2015 GMMP report, and not all indicators of interest were published in the 
2015 report. Although it is impossible for this study to definitively establish direction of causality 
between media sexism and women’s political ambition, according to David Hume’s idea of cause 
and effect: “(1) cause and effect must occur close together in time (contiguity); (2) the cause must 
occur before an effect does; and (3) the effect should never occur without the presence of the 
cause” (Field, 2009, p.13). Conditions 1 and 2 require the 2010 report to be used instead of 2015.!
! The seven indicators above are chosen because they best represent the patterns of media 
sexism identified in the case study literature on women candidates. Heldman et al. (2006) explain 
the negative impact being shown less than male candidates had on U.S. presidential candidate 
Elizabeth Dole. The potentially harmful impact of gender stereotypes is shown to get in women’s 
way in election media (Bromander, 2012; Heldman et al., 2006; Fox and Lawless, 2004). Family 
status being tied to women candidates shows women’s identity as tied to family, not political 
careers (Murray, 2008; Dolan, 2014; Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011; Anderson et al., 2011). The role 
women are shown in (for example, in political stories, as experts or as politicians, quoted rather 
than shown visually) impacts what media consumers can know about women and how important 
they are perceived to be (Rättvisaren, 2015, p.6). These aspects are not all-encompassing to the 
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 Because of the low number of observations, several interesting controls are not used in the main 1
models. See Appendix 3 for models including these controls.
 Indicators 5-7 are computed from the original indicators provided in GMMP (2010, p.66-107).2
patterns identified in the literature; however, GMMP does not produce indicators for all aspects of 
media sexism.!
! Some scholars discussed in the literature review bring up the importance of distinguishing 
effects of hostile and benevolent sexism in measuring sexism, but media sexism contains elements 
of both that cannot be distinguished. According to Sibley et al. (2007), benevolent and hostile 
sexism are interrelated and exist in unison. Questioning women political candidates’ viability and 
ability to make impact is one example of how media sexism can be hostile, while showing women 
more often than men in terms of their family relationships and linking them to women’s issues is an 
example of how it can be benevolent. As there are theoretically grounded reasons for selecting the 
seven indicators chosen, the empirical study will be a necessary departure for future studies with 
more fine-tuned global media sexism indicators. However, despite selecting indicators based on 
literature and with hostile and benevolent sexism in mind, there is not previous comparative 
empirical research to base the indicator selection on. Therefore, all indicators must be tested to 
provide insight for future research.!!
SHARE OF WOMAN CANDIDATES!
In a global cross-sectional study, women’s political ambition cannot be directly measured in the 
way that case studies in the literature have measured it: via survey and experimental data. The 
share of candidates to the lower chamber of parliament is used as a proxy for political ambition for 
three main reasons. Firstly, the share of seats in the lower chamber is the standard measure in the 
related field of women’s descriptive and substantive representation (Wängnerd, 2009). Therefore, if 
women’s political representation and electoral success is best measured by how many seats 
women have in the lower house of parliament, the share of candidates to this chamber is an 
appropriate gauge for women’s political ambition. Secondly, this measure is comparable across 
national settings, unlike other political candidates. Thirdly, other elected positions, for example 
ministers or presidents, will have much fewer candidates than parliaments do overall.!
! The data for the variable is collected primarily from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). 
Countries with elections between the years 2012 and 2015 are included if their lower chamber is 
elected via direct elections. If a country had more than one election to the lower house in this 
period, the more recent election is used. Missing values are found on national government 
websites, national electoral commission websites or through election reports by organisations 
monitoring or observing the election. Appendix 1 presents six countries where the data was used in 
the analysis but was irregular (for example, the candidates for the lower chamber are not 
separated from the candidates for the upper chamber, but both chambers were elected directly) 
and provides further details into the sources of data not found via IPU.!
! The measure is not perfect. Firstly, “Female candidates are more likely than men to report 
having been recruited to run for office, suggesting that without outside encouragement and support 
for a candidacy, they will be less likely than men with comparable backgrounds to emerge in the 
electoral arena” (Lawless, 2003, p.78). Secondly, certain countries that reserve seats for women 
do not require candidates for these seats to be publicly elected (Dahlerup et al., 2013, p.26). It 
would be more representative of political ambition to be able to see how many women put 
themselves forward, but this may not be possible in a comparative study without the introduction of 
a world-wide qualitative survey of parliamentary candidates.!!
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SHARE OF WOMEN IN THE LOWER HOUSE !3
As seen in the literature review, it is common to argue that women become more politically 
engaged when they see more women represented in parliaments. Therefore, the first control 
variable to consider is the share of women in the lower house. This variable is collected from the 
IPU, and reflects “information provided by National Parliaments by 31 December 2010. 188 
countries are classified by descending order of the percentage of women in the lower or single 
House” (IPU, 2010).!!
ELECTORAL SYSTEM!
Electoral system is the second control variable that will be considered. Although it is not usually 
linked with women’s political ambition, it is heavily argued and controlled for in the literature 
regarding factors that improve women’s ability to be elected (Dahlerup et al., 2013; Murray, 2008; 
Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014). The variable is collected from the Quality of Government 
(QoG) dataset, and reflects the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). 
The variable is a dummy that reflects whether or not the majority of seats in directly elected 
parliaments are elected via proportional representation or plurality.!!
WOMEN’S RIGHTS!
The literature uses a myriad of different techniques and variables to measure gender equality in 
society. This study chooses a simple additive index of three variables reflecting women’s social, 
political and economic rights. These three variables are collected from the QoG dataset, and reflect 
the data from The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database (Cingranelli and Richards, 
2010). The three variables are ordinal variables where 0 reflects the lowest, and 3 the highest, 
women’s rights in the respective area, as of the year 2010. The additive measure created reflects 0 
for lowest women’s rights in all categories, and 9 reflects the highest score in each of the 
component parts. Although this is a fairly blunt instrument, it is meant to give the general level of 
women’s rights in society and therefore measure similar aspects to for instance gender equality 
culture (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014) and cultural, structural and institutional indicators of 
gender equality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).!
! In the interaction models in Set B, a dummy is created out of the women’s rights variable. A 
value of 0 in this dummy is given to countries that have below the midpoint of the rights scale 
(below 4.5) and a value of 1 to countries above the midpoint.!!
DEVELOPMENT!
The UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) measures health, wealth and education (Malik, 
2013). The variable reports HDI levels in 2010 and is collected from the QoG dataset. It is chosen 
as a control variable because GDP, development levels generally, health and education are all 
important considerations in the literature on women’s political representation (Brandt, 2011; 
Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014). The HDI variable is logged before being used in the models, to 
correct for being abnormally distributed. In the interaction models in Set C, HDI is used without 
being logged.!!
CORRUPTION!
Wängnerud’s (2009) review of the most important studies in women’s representation points to 
several studies that empirically prove the relationship between corruption and the share of women 
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 Share of women in parliament is not highly correlated enough with the share of women 3
candidates to be considered a proxy: the Pearson correlation between the two variables is 0.683.
in parliaments, although “the causal direction of the relationship is not clear” (Wängnerud, 2009, p.
58). It is important to control for whether corruption is significant also in relation to women 
candidates. The variable chosen reflects freedom from corruption as of 2010 (Heritage Foundation, 
2014) and is from the QoG dataset. Just as with HDI, corruption is logged to improve normality of 
distribution.!!
MEDIA ACCESS!
Koch (1999) and others discuss the impact media has as a spreader of information in election 
times. If media is not accessible to many within the population, media sexism will not have a strong 
pull on women. The variable for media access expresses the percentage of the population with 
access to media in 2012, and is taken from the Varieties of Democracy dataset.!!
5.3: Power and limitations of the methodology!
Although a panel data study would have allowed for confidence in asserting causality, a cross-
sectional study will contribute to filling the literature gap of empirically testing if media sexism 
impacts women’s political ambitions in the first global study of its kind. Using quantitative methods 
was necessary in order to produce a global study, but it does mean that the study cannot account 
for subnational factors that are considered important in many of the case studies in the field, such 
as differences between municipalities and party politics, nor study the production and reproduction 
aspects of media sexism separately. A qualitative content analysis of media would have allowed for 
a more nuanced understanding of media sexism, but not allowed for an understanding of the 
impact this has on women candidates globally. Overall, a cross-sectional study is a necessary 
contribution to the literature, and the results of experimental studies and case studies would not be 
as applicable to other cases and future studies. Furthermore, as the next section shows, a small-
scale case study of media sexism and women’s political ambition in Sweden is conducted in 
addition to the main empirical analysis.!
! Although the GMMP 2010 report collected data for 108 countries, when used in models 
with the data collected from other sources, only 58 observations remain. As no other media sexism 
variable is available, this could not be avoided. Arguably, GMMP’s individual country coding relies 
on too small of a sample to be fully representative of the entire media of that country — however, 
the Swedish GMMP sample results were in line with extremely comprehensive studies by Swedish 
media organisations (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015, p.35). Similarly, IPU did not provide 
information for candidates for all countries in their data. Where possible, this information has been 
found elsewhere, but this introduces more possibility of error into the data collection.!
! For the goal of testing the effect of media sexism on women’s political ambition, the design 
is appropriate. The interactions that will be conducted are tested for development variables and 
women’s rights. This ensures that the study has tested several avenues with the data available to 
understand if, and under what conditions, media sexism has a negative impact on the level of 
women candidates. Therefore, despite the limitations, the study believes that if significant 
relationships are found when controlling for the variables described above and using three sets of 
models (one without interactions, one interacting with development and one with women’s rights), 
a correlation between media sexism and women’s political ambition is supported.!!
5.4: Case study!
There are two reasons this study includes a case study on Sweden. Firstly, the patterns of media 
sexism identified in the literature review not accommodated for in the GMMP reports are important 
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aspects of media sexism. By conducting coding on a selection of newspaper articles in Sweden’s 
most widespread newspaper, Aftonbladet (Mediekompass, 2014), these additional measures of 
media sexism can be incorporated into the study. Secondly, as a time series study was not 
possible for the main analysis, the case study allows for testing the media sexism indicators over 
time in the case of Sweden.!
! Sweden is chosen because it is one of the most gender neutral countries with the highest 
women’s development score (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015; UNDP.org, 2015). Aalberg and 
Strömbäck (2011) find that gender differences in relationships between media and MPs are smaller 
in Sweden than in Norway — they find also that gendered political reporting in particular is low in 
Scandinavia. Indeed, Sweden has the highest proportion of women in the news out of the Nordic 
countries and 7% more women than the global average (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015, p.23). 
34% of politicians in Swedish news are women versus the global average of 18% (Edström and 
Jacobsson, 2015, p.37). Therefore, if a relationship between media sexism and share of women 
candidates is found in Sweden over time, a time dynamic relationship is likely to exist globally.!
! As the case study is a supplement to the main analysis, and not an empirical analysis, the 
material to be coded has been limited. Other case studies in the literature have conducted content 
analyses of periods ranging form a month to two years (Mathews, 2007; Ibroscheva and Raicheva-
Stover, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011), while GMMP codes a variety of media for one day. This case 
study will instead be coding only newspaper front pages, articles mentioning politicians or 
candidates and political ads in Aftonbladet. The date two weeks, one week and one day before an 
election are selected for each of the ten elections between 1979 and 2010. If the argument made 
in Hypothesis 4 holds, then the media sexism in time period 1 will impact the number of women 
candidates to the election in time period 2. Therefore, the share of women candidates are found for 
the ten elections 1982 to 2014. The indicators corresponding to the GMMP indicators are coded 
according to the GMMP guidelines, while the additional indicators are coded according to how 
similar measures or concepts are discussed in the literature. More information about this coding 
can be seen in Appendix 2. The following indicators are collected in the case study:!
A. the same indicators 2-7 from GMMP (1 is excluded as only political news are considered in 
the case study)!
B. the difference between the share of women news subjects that are shown in a passive 
rather than active role minus male!
C. the share of female news subjects in the occupation of politician presented as novelties!
D. the difference between the share of female news subjects whose appearance is focused on 
minus male!
E. the difference between the share of political advertisements showing specific female news 
subjects minus male!
F. the difference between the face-to-body ratio of women photographed minus men!
G. the difference between the number of female news subjects in the occupation of politician 
shown on the front page minus male!
H. the share of female news subjects in the occupation of politician discussed mainly or only in 
reference to women’s issues!
I. the share of female reporters!
J. the difference between the share of female news subjects in the occupation of politician 
referenced by first name when their full name or title is not given minus male!
K. the difference between the share of female news subjects in the occupation of politician 
whose potential impact or viability in politics is questioned minus male!
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The indicators are chosen because of their importance in the literature. Women are often portrayed 
in ways that make them seem passive in the events described in media (UNESCO, 2012; GMMP, 
2010; Edström and Mølster, 2014), which is in contrast to perceptions of leadership (Kahn, 1994). 
Presenting women candidates as novelties, by for example focusing on that they are the first 
woman candidate for a position, makes them appear as though they are trespassing into a male 
role (Heldman et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2011). When political advertisements, made by parties 
or candidates themselves, choose to focus on male candidates, this can contribute to stereotyping 
gender roles (UNESCO, 2012). A focus on appearance can make the candidate seem less serious 
and therefore less of a viable political choice (Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011; Murray, 2008; Larris 
and Maggio, 2012; Heldman et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2011). The face-to-body ratio describes 
the percentage of a person’s photograph showing their face (Mathews, 2007); a lower face-to-body 
ratio of women depicted in intellectual occupations (such as politics) is an objective measure of 
media’s decision to highlight women’s cerebral qualities less than men’s (Mathews, 2007; Konrath 
et al., 2012).!
! Women are often disproportionately shown in media regarding women’s issues (Dolan, 
2010), such as health care, education, family, elderly and child care (Heldman et al., 2006) and 
even welfare policy and equality (Wängnerud, 2000)— this can lead to a strengthening of 
cleavages between male and female roles in politics (Towns, 2003). The share of women reporting 
the news is a focus in many media sexism organisations, which suggest that women reporting the 
news strive to decrease the underrepresentation of women (GMMP, 2010; UNESCO, 2012). When 
women are referred to by their first name or Ms/Mrs while men are referred to by their full name or 
job title each time they are mentioned, this becomes a subtle way to frame the woman as not fully 
belonging in her professional role (Anderson et al., 2011; Bromander, 2012; Ibroscheva and 
Raicheva-Stover, 2009; Carlin and Winfrey, 2009). Whether female or only male politicians are 
shown on the front page signals how important they are (Heldman et al., 2006). Questioning 
women’s competence, viability as a politician or ability to get enough funding or votes in a way that 
is not done for men also suggests women do not belong in the political sphere (Murray, 2008; 
Anderson et al., 2011, Heldman et al., 2006).!
! The relevant studies focusing on language and discourse (Anderson et al., 2011; Ezeifeka 
and Osakwe, 2013; Mills, 2003) provide a solid argument for looking deeper into sexism than just 
numbers. Heldman et al. (2006) argue the importance of “the tone of the coverage. Our 
expectation is that some of the most important gender differences in coverage may be subtle and 
involve the differential use of language” (p.319). This is why it is considered necessary to include 
media sexism indicators that are subjective, in that they include the author’s subjective 
considerations of how language and images are used to undermine or dismiss women in political 
news stories. However, this introduces bias. The case study is therefore only an indication of the 
potential long term relationship that future research might find; the results of the case study should 
not be considered a confirmation of a long term relationship or lack thereof, but an indication of 
what the long term relationship may be.!!
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6: Empirical analysis and results!!
The following analysis will test empirically if a relationship between media sexism and women’s 
political ambition exists, and then discuss this in terms of the bystander effect and the production 
and reproduction mechanisms media sexism is hypothesised to work through. Should the analysis 
yield that a relationship exists, the hypotheses presented in the Methodology predict it will be 
negative.!
! Additional questions need answering in terms of the possible impact media sexism has on 
women’s political ambitions. This section will first examine the validity and reliability of the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) models produced. The results will then be presented and discussed in three 
separate subsections. The results of the case study will then be discussed before all results are 
summarised.!!
6.1: Validity and reliability!
The OLS models made in this study will only be reliable and valid if the OLS assumptions are met. 
Each subheading below shows how the models meet the assumptions. OLS diagnostics for 
models in all three sets can be seen in Appendix 5.!!
LINEARITY!
A linear relationship is seen in all three sets. However, the number of observations in the models is 
only 58. This is much lower than desirable, and reduces the ability to see clearly an obvious 
linearity.!!
OUTLIERS!
There are no outliers in the models in Set A or B. In Set C, Tunisia is a near outlier, so models are 
tested both with and without Tunisia.!!
MULTICOLLINEARITY!
Multicollinearity, measured by Tolerance values below 0.200 and VIF values above 5.000, is not 
seen in Set A or C. This ensures that the variables included are not highly correlated, and all 
variables can therefore be included. However, Set B does experience multicollinearity in the 
variables that are being interacted — that is, between the media sexism indicator, development 
and women’s rights. Some multicollinearity between variables that contain the same base variables 
is expected, but since multicollinearity is not seen in the interaction variables in Set C, it may imply 
that models in Set B are less trustworthy than those in Set A and C.!!
NORMALITY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF ERRORS!
All three sets show normality of errors. As the histogram in Appendix 5 shows, the mean is close to 
0 and standard deviation close to 1, with a normal bell curve being seen.!!
HOMOSCEDASTICITY!
In order for the assumption of homoscedasticity to be met, the distribution of errors around the 
predicted values for the dependent and independent variables cannot show a pattern and must 
centre around 0. The scatterplots in Appendix 5 shows no pattern in the residuals in any of the 
three sets, and therefore homoscedasticity is met.!!
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6.2: Set A!
CORRELATION BETWEEN MEDIA SEXISM AND SHARE OF WOMEN CANDIDATES!!
One out of the seven media sexism indicators reveals a negative relationship with the share of 
women candidates that holds up to all relevant controls and supports Hypothesis 1. The following 
regression table, Table 6.1, shows the OLS models of the media sexism indicator for the share of 
news subjects portrayed in the role of expert that are female (MS4). Appendix 4 shows the models 
with other media sexism indicators (from Sets A-C), where it can be seen that certain indicators are 
significant in bivariate models or with only a few but not all controls. The fact that other indicators 
did not retain significance throughout the models could be because women in news are often 
shown in a more negative light than men, as seen in the literature. The media sexism indicators 
report only the share of women in media in different roles, and do not pick up on subtle differences 
in portrayal. Although only one out of seven indicators are significant, there is little help from the 
case study literature in selecting what indicators of media sexism will be useful for empirical 
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Table 6.1: MS4 (Share of news subjects portrayed as Experts that are female)
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6 7
MS4 (expert) 0.482*** 0.348** 0.336** 0.316** 0.334** 0.343** 0.337**
(0.130) (0.109) (0.095) (0.097) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
Women in lower 
house
0.578*** 0.456*** 0.409** 0.360* 0.374** 0.347*
(0.108) (0.098) (0.111) (0.134) (0.135) (0.137)
Electoral system -9.468*** -9.340*** -9.362*** -9.317*** -8.679***
(2.179) (2.187) (2.199) (2.203) (2.266)
HDI (logged) 4.342 1.117 4.070 0.975
(4.766) (6.847) (7.592) (8.037)









Constant 15.301*** 6.823* 14.119*** 17.046*** 13.316* 26.554 22.098
(3.143) (0.38) (3.123) (4.422) (7.195) (16.275) (16.685)
R2 0.198 0.473 0.610 0.616 0.619 0.625 0.635
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: OLS models for the basic, linear relationship between media sexism (expert indicator) and the share of women 
candidates with control variables added.
analysis; it is unlikely that share of experts is the only aspect of media sexism that will impact 
women’s political ambition in reality.!
! The first model in Set A is the bivariate model including only the independent variable of 
MS4 and the dependent variable of the share of women candidates. On its own, MS4 explains 
19.8% of the variation in the share of women candidates. A 1% increase in MS4 correlates with a 
0.5% increase in the share of candidates that are women. The relationship is significant at the 
99.9% confidence level (there is less than a 0.001% chance of the relationship not existing). 
Adding controls shows this relationship to continue being significant but at the 99% level, and with 
a lower coefficient: when including all the controls, a 1% increase in MS4 correlates with a 0.3% 
increase in the share of women candidates. MS4 and all controls together explain 63.5% of the 
variation in the share of women candidates.!
! Interestingly, not all of the controls are shown to be significant. This could be because the 
controls are based on what is seen in the literature to impact the success of women candidates, 
not women’s political ambition. The only control selected based on the literature expecting it to 
impact women’s willingness to run is the share of women with seats in parliament. Women in the 
lower house has a significant correlation (although the level of significance decreases from 99.9% 
to 90% when all controls are added) with the share of women candidates, and the correlation is 
positive, suggesting that with 1% more women in the lower house of parliament, 0.4% more 
women are willing to run as candidates. The results in these models act according to the 
expectation that seeing women in power will increase political ambition. This adds an interesting 
development to the survey based study by Fox and Lawless (2005), which finds that young people 
have lower political ambition when they belong to groups historically excluded from politics, 
because this finding suggests that the historical lack of belonging as a disincentive to running 
could decrease as more people have overcome the historical exclusion.!
! Electoral system retains a significance level of 99.9%, and is therefore highly significant 
throughout all models. As electoral system is a dummy variable, where a proportional 
representation (PR) system receives a value of 0, the models corroborate the literature on 
women’s representation in politics by suggesting that women are better served in PR than plurality 
systems. The standard errors for electoral system, logged HDI and logged freedom from corruption 
are noticeably high. This is a problem common in models with low observations. Possibly, had 
there been more observations, the standard errors would have been reduced and perhaps control 
variables had greater significance. Although HDI, women’s rights, corruption and media access are 
not significant, with the exception of corruption the coefficients prescribe the expected 
relationships.!
! Although there is no way with the current study to test this assertion, it is possible that 
corruption would have a positive rather than negative effect (and therefore, freedom from 
corruption a negative rather than positive effect) on women’s political ambition. The literature finds 
that corrupt systems exclude women, and therefore reduce their chances of winning elections. 
However, these corrupt systems may mobilise women to try to change the system. In other words, 
women living with high quality of government and low corruption may feel less inclined to break 
gender norms by aspiring to political careers than women living under high levels of corruption. 
This study has no premise to test this theory, and indeed the idea that seeing corruption mobilises 
people to act against corruption has been argued to be incorrect because knowing the high extent 
of corruption can disillusion people from feeling it can be fought (Bauhr and Grimes, 2013).!
! Share of women in parliament and electoral system are the only significant control 
variables in the models. What this suggests is that the factors explaining women’s political ambition 
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differ from the factors explaining their political success; i.e., that demand and supply of women 
candidates have different determinants. This alone is an interesting finding that deserves further 
exploration. Women’s willingness to run is a different animal entirely from women’s success when 
they do run. Firstly, there can be no assumption of perfect information: women outside of the 
political system are unlikely to know what their chances of success in politics are. As has been 
discussed, many studies have found women to have low levels of candidacy even where they have 
high rates of success when they do compete politically. Therefore, even if the political arena is in 
fact positively inclined to elect women, this will not necessarily translate to women deciding 
whether to pursue political careers. Secondly, and relatedly, factors that impact political ambition 
may have little to no impact on voters. Informal institutional factors, such as media sexism and 
socialisation, could have a greater impact on personal decision making than on evaluations of 
others — indeed, this has been suggested (Fox and Lawless, 2005). However, there is not scope 
in this study to solidify these claims.!
! Overall, the models in Set A do not contradict Hypothesis 1, because they suggest a 
negative relationship between media sexism and women candidates. Although only one media 
sexism indicator was significant when including all control variables, this does not mean that the 
other indicators are not important. It could mean that the other media sexism indicators are only 
significant over time, or that this study has not identified the most important aspects of media 
sexism. Both are likely, as media sexism is sticky (GMMP, 2010) and there is no previous study of 
this kind to aid in understanding which indicators specifically can be influential for women’s political 
ambition. As women are shown more in the prominent role of expert in media rather than for 
example in terms of their personal experience or being an eye witness, they are shown as 
authoritative rather than passive. This variable measures both the production and reproduction 
aspects of media sexism depending on the country. In countries where women are established in 
the workforce, with upward mobility, a low share of women experts as news subjects reflects the 
media producing sexism, in showing society in a more gender segregated way than reality. In 
countries where women are instead not present in paying jobs, a low share of women experts as 
news subjects reflects media reproducing sexism, in reinforcing the gendered makeup of the 
society. In both cases, the bystander effect helps to understand why women seeing media include 
authoritative, expert female voices could translate into a feeling of belonging in powerful roles in 
society, such as politics. Models in Set B and C test if media sexism acts differently in different 
country contexts.!!
6.3: Set B!
MEDIA SEXISM AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS INTERACTION!!
Two media sexism indicators have a relationship with share of women candidates that holds up in 
women’s rights interaction models even when all controls are added, but this relationship is 
stronger where women’s rights are low, the opposite of what Hypothesis 2 expected. Each media 
indicator is interacted with a dummy created for high and low women’s rights in turn, and both MS4 
(the expert indicator) and MS6 (a dummy for whether women are more likely to be shown in photos 
than not, and men are more likely not to be shown in photos) retain significance even when all 
controls are included in the model. As mentioned, there is some multicollinearity in the Set B 
models: the models using MS4 exceed the VIF value of 5.000 and are below 0.200 tolerance. 
However, the models do not fail the more lenient interpretation of multicollinearity that only requires 
VIF values to remain below 10.000 and tolerance values to remain above 0.100. Only the variables 
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involved in the interaction term (i.e., MS4 and women’s rights) do not pass the stricter test, and 
therefore the models are still considered trustworthy.!
! As seen in Tables 2 and 3 respectively, MS4 and MS6 are positive while the interaction 
terms, MS4_rights and MS6_rights, are negative, and all are significant. Therefore, the models 
show that the level of women’s rights impacts the effect media sexism has on the share of women 
candidates, as predicted by the hypothesis. As women’s rights has been transformed into a 
dummy, when women’s rights are high (above the midpoint of the women’s rights scale), the 
equation discussed in the methodology must be considered as follows when determining the 
impact of media sexism on the share of women candidates:!!
when women’s rights=0, Share of women candidates=a+b1MS+e!!
when women’s rights=1, Share of women candidates=a+b1MS+b2+b3MS+e!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! =(a+b2)+(b1+b3)MS+e!!
! Beginning with Table 6.2, the bivariate model including only MS4, the women’s rights 
dummy and the interaction term multiplying the two is significant. Therefore, a 1% increase in MS4 
corresponds to a 0.6% increase in the share of women candidates where women’s rights are low. 
Where women’s rights are high, a 1% increase in MS4 corresponds only to a 0.1% increase 
(0.569-0.463) in the share of women candidates . Without any controls, it is therefore very clear 4
that the level of women’s rights changes the impact media sexism has on women’s political 
ambition according to indicator MS4. However, the hypothesis was that where women’s rights are 
low, there are too many other factors hindering women from running that media sexism alone will 
not be important. Instead, the models in Table 6.2 show that where there are low women’s rights, 
MS4 has a stronger impact than where women’s rights are high. This could mean that the 
reproduction role of media sexism is stronger than the production role in these models: when 
media reproduces sexism in society, it is acting as a mirror to society, and a low share of women 
experts in the news would simply be reflecting the low share of women experts in society. Although 
this contradicts Hypothesis 2, it is a logical outcome when considering that these media sexism 
indicators are somewhat blunt: they cannot separate the production from the reproduction effect of 
media sexism, and therefore cannot determine where media sexism is a conveyor of sexism in 
society versus when media sexism is skewing reality by showing a more sexist society than what is 
the case. The hypothesis refers equally to the production and the reproduction effect, but the 
results seem to show that when interacting media sexism with women’s rights, the reproduction 
effect may be stronger.!
! Also unexpectedly, as more controls are included, a 1% increase in MS4 corresponds to a 
lower share of women candidates in countries with high women’s rights, but a higher share of 
women candidates in countries with low women’s rights (models 3-6). This, although not predicted 
by the hypothesis, is in line with the literature and the definition laid out by this study. Media sexism 
is not simply about underrepresentation of women, but also misrepresentation of women. Women 
in media are more likely to be shown in ways non-conducive to inspiring women consuming media, 
including being sexualised, trivialised and patronised. It could be that in countries where there are 
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 The impact of women’s rights in the bivariate, Table 6.2: moving from low to high women’s rights 4
corresponds with a 19.8% increase in the share of women if MS4 is 50%. If MS4 is 0, moving to 
high women’s rights corresponds with a 20.0% increase.
low women’s rights, women are mobilised from simply seeing women in agentic roles in media, 
such as seeing women experts. However, in countries where women have high rights, it may not 
be enough to see women in the news, women may instead have to also be presented as equally 
powerful as men in the news. Therefore, it is unclear if Hypothesis 2 is supported or not, but what 
is clear is that media sexism acts differently when women’s rights are high versus low.!
! Overall, the controls in Table 6.2 act as they did in the models in Set A, seen in Table 6.1. 
Share of women with seats in parliament and electoral system are significant and suggest that 
more women in parliament and a PR electoral system are favourable for women candidates. HDI 
and media access are not significant, but the signs are consistent with the expectations from 
literature: higher development and greater share of the population with access to media is linked, 
though not through significant coefficients, with the share of women candidates. Corruption acts as 
in the Set A models.!
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Table 6.2: MS4 Women’s rights interaction
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS4 (expert) 0.569*** 0.467** 0.537*** 0.536*** 0.539*** 0.538***
(0.140) (0.130) (0.106) (0.111) (0.111) (0.116)
Women's rights 
dummy
20.038** 11.706* 17.737** 17.674** 17.956** 17.900**
(6.052) (6.010) (4.969) (5.462) (5.488) (6.083)
MS4_rights -0.463* -0.366 -0.623** -0.622** -0.635** -0.633**
(0.249) (0.229) (0.190) (0.192) (0.193) (0.207)
Women in lower 
house
0.463** 0.297* 0.297* 0.330** 0.330**
(0.133) (0.112) (0.113) (0.120) (0.122)
Electoral system -11.170*** -11.164*** -11.151*** -11.134***
(2.053) (2.082) (2.088) (2.252)








Constant 8.401* 4.734 12.003*** 12.115* 24.082 24.010
(3.352) (3.230) (2.926) (4.862) (15.109) (15.601)
R2 0.397 0.509 0.687 0.687 0.691 0.691
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: OLS interaction models where media sexism (expert indicator) is interacted with a women’s rights dummy.
! In Table 6.3, a similar situation unravels for MS6. In the bivariate, it can be seen that 
without controlling for relevant factors, moving from a coding of 0 to 1 in the dummy MS6 
corresponds to an 8.8% increase in the share of women candidates in countries with low women’s 
rights — unexpected, as the literature shows that being disproportionately often shown in 
photographs harms women in political careers and female candidates. However, in countries with 
high women’s rights, moving to a coding of 1 in MS6 corresponds to a 7.4% decrease 
(8.769-16.186) in the share of women candidates . The control variables in Table 6.3 act in the 5
same manner as in Table 6.2, and will therefore not be discussed again. Noteworthy for Table 6.3 
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Table 6.3: MS6 Women’s rights interaction— without outlier Tunisia
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS6 (photo) 8.769* 8.425* 6.177* 5.942* 6.143* 6.421*
(3.881) (3.549) (3.019) (3.172) (3.254) (3.231)
Women's rights 
dummy
21.406*** 13.413** 12.765** 12.092* 12.089* 11.376*
(4.054) (4.396) (3.695) (4.506) (4.547) (4.537)
MS6_rights -16.186** -14.027** -11.511** -11.401* -11.416* -12.617**
(5.372) (4.952) (4.194) (4.253) (4.291) (4.342)
Women in lower 
house
0.461** 0.304* 0.301* 0.319* 0.294*
(0.136) (0.119) (0.121) (0.133) (0.133)
Electoral system -10.250*** -10.194*** -10.146*** -9.150***
(2.152) (2.182) (2.206) (2.304)








Constant 14.231*** 9.030** 17.896*** 18.985** 24.150 19.340
(2.744) (2.943) (3.095) (5.152) (15.880) (16.127)
R2 0.367 0.481 0.641 0.641 0.642 0.656
N 57 57 57 57 57 57
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: OLS interaction models where media sexism (dummy, photo indicator) is interacted with a women’s rights 
dummy.
 The impact of women’s rights in the bivariate, Table 6.3: moving from low to high women’s rights 5
corresponds to a 5.2% increase in the share of women candidates when MS6 is 1, and to a 21.4% 
increase when MS6 is 0.
is that the models are run without Tunisia in the sample. This is because Tunisia was found to be 
an outlier (see Appendix 5). However, the models run with Tunisia can be seen in Appendix 4.!
! What was the case in models 3-6 in Table 6.2 is the case for all models in Table 6.3: high 
women’s rights mean that MS6 has a negative impact on the share of women candidates, while 
low women’s rights mean that MS6 has a positive impact on the share of women candidates. This 
again is inconclusive in terms of whether it supports Hypothesis 2. It may be that being visible at 
all, even disproportionately in photographs, is positive in contexts where women are often not seen 
at all, and that the negative effects of being shown disproportionately often in photos in media only 
becomes negative for women in contexts where women have relatively more power in society. For 
example, women in the more secular ‘Western world’ are perhaps more likely to be shown in highly 
sexualised ways in mainstream media than in other areas of the world: as being objectified in 
media is strongly argued to negatively impact women’s ambition (Gill, 2011), this could help explain 
why being disproportionately shown in photos is only negative for women’s political ambition where 
women’s rights are high.!!
6.4: Set C!
MEDIA SEXISM AND DEVELOPMENT INTERACTION!!
The models in Set C interact with HDI, and show that media sexism as measured by MS6 has a 
negative relationship with the share of women candidates only in developed countries, but a 
positive relationship in developing countries: as Hypothesis 3 expressed that media sexism would 
have a greater impact in developed countries, it is unclear if the hypothesis is supported by the 
data. HDI ranges from values between 0 and 1, and is therefore continuous rather than 
dichotomous. When discussing in this section developed and developing countries, it is not a 
distinction between all observations in the sample grouped into a low and high development 
category; instead, it is a hypothetical distinction between countries with no development and full 
development (unless otherwise stated).!
! Just as for the models in Table 6.3 of Set B, the coefficients for the independent variable 
and interaction terms in all models in Set C lead to an overall negative relationship between MS6 
and the share of women candidates in developed countries. In the bivariate model of Table 6.4, it 
can be seen that moving from a coding of 0 to 1 of MS6 corresponds with a 27.0% increase in the 
share of women candidates in developing countries, but a 14.7% decrease (27.004-41.717) in the 
share of women candidates in developed countries . This change from women disproportionately 6
shown in photos being positive for share of women candidates in developing contexts but negative 
in developed contexts is assumed to work through similar mechanisms as when this relationship 
occurs in the Set B women’s rights interaction models. That is, without high development women 
are less able to take on non-traditional gender roles, and therefore seeing women in any way 
represented in media is positive for encouraging women’s political ambition. When there is high 
development, women must instead see women in media represented in gender equal ways relative 
to men in order to be encouraged by it, and therefore seeing women disproportionately 
photographed is discouraging rather than encouraging.!
! As there is no country in the sample, or indeed the world, that has no development or full 
development, it is useful to contextualise the models with what are more realistic development 
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 The impact of HDI in the bivariate, Table 6.4: a one unit increase in HDI corresponds to a 14.7% 6
increase in the share of women candidates when MS6 is 1, and to a 56.4% increase when MS6 is 
0.
levels. The mean level of HDI in the variable used in this study is 0.676, the highest 0.94 and the 
lowest 0.32. The following calculations refer to the equation introduced in the Methodology section 
should the value of Z be exchanged for 0.676, 0.94 and 0.32 respectively. Moving from a coding of 
0 to 1 in MS6 therefore corresponds to a 1.2% (27.004-41.717(.676)) decrease for observations 
with mean HDI; a 12.2% (27.004-41.717(.94)) decrease for observations with maximum HDI; and a 
13.7% (27.004-41.717(.32)) increase for observations with minimum HDI. Using realistic values of 
high and low development rather than 0 and 1 reveals the same relationship and suggests that 
MS6 interacts negatively with the share of women candidates only when development levels are 
high. Hypothesis 3 is therefore not contradicted.!
! Just as in the models of Table 6.1 in Set A and Tables 2 and 3 in Set B, women in 
parliament and electoral system are significant, although electoral system is slightly less significant 
throughout the models in Table 6.4 than in the first three. The other controls, women’s rights and 
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Table 6.4: MS6 HDI interaction
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS6 (photo) 27.004* 25.679* 22.959* 23.213* 23.809* 26.099*
(12.107) (10.837) (9.579) (9.772) (9.904) (9.766)
HDI 56.375*** 33.513** 30.685** 29.378* 32.861* 25.799*
(11.639) (12.024) (10.624) (12.979) (14.594) (14.791)
MS6_HDI -41.717* -36.942* -34.231* -34.570* -34.905* -38.741**
(16.614) (14.917) (13.169) (13.428) (13.537) (13.404)
Women in lower 
house
0.508*** 0.401** 0.389** 0.403** 0.346*
(0.134) (0.121) (0.140) (0.143) (0.144)
Electoral system -9.209*** -9.219*** -9.140*** -8.117**
(2.289) (2.312) (2.332) (2.349)








Constant -11.953 -6.928 2.172 2.427 8.100 6.369
(7.903) (7.193) (6.733) (6.946) (12.679) (12.434)
R2 0.318 0.464 0.591 0.592 0.594 0.620
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: OLS interaction models where media sexism (dummy, photo indicator) is interacted with HDI.
corruption, again are not significant, and the direction of the relationships they point to (again, 
without significance) are the same as in the other sets of models.!
! Interestingly, media access becomes significant in the final model. It has a small positive 
relationship, whereby a 1% increase in the population with media access corresponds to 0.2% 
higher share of women candidates. Although media access was included in the models to ensure 
that controlling for media access would not override the impact of media sexism (because if people 
are not exposed to media, women cannot be influenced by media sexism when deciding career 
choice), it is interesting to see that in this set of models, greater media access can be a positive 
factor for women’s political ambition. This is indeed an encouraging finding, as many in the 
literature bring up the potential media has to be a positive force for gender equality (Edström and 
Mølster, 2014; Schlehofer et al., 2011; Koch, 1999). If greater media access correlates with more 
women running for parliament, the possibilities for increasing the supply of women candidates by 
decreasing media sexism seem very promising.!!
6.5: Case Study!
The Swedish case study allows for exploring possible long term effects and alternative measures 
of media sexism. The case of Swedish women representatives is one that can, according to 
Freidenvall (2013), be divided into three time periods. First, from women’s suffrage to 1971 is the 
period of the “obligatory woman” (p.103), where parties felt like as long as there was one token 
woman on their list they were making enough effort to incorporate women. Second, the “51 percent 
minority” (p.105) refers to the time period between 1972-1993 when gender equality was salient in 
the electoral movements. Thirdly, 1994 to present time is the “every other one for the 
ladies” (Freidenvall, 2013, p.113) period, where a realisation that women’s progress was not on a 
strictly upward moving path led to more concrete methods to break institutional norms.!
! The case study begins in the second phase. The share of women candidates to the 
Riksdag (Swedish parliament) increases overall from 36.2% in 1982 to 45.2% in 2014. The media 
sample is collected and coded for 1979 to 2010, since it is assumed that media sexism in one 
electoral period will correlate with the share of women candidates stepping forward in the next. The 
graphs presented therefore give candidate share in time t+1 but media sexism indicators at time t. 
The values for each of the three days coded (2 weeks, 1 week and 1 day before the election) is 
averaged to give a final value per indicator per election. The 2010 Global Media Monitoring Project 
(GMMP) measures for MS2-MS7 used in the empirical analysis can be compared to the case 
study measures in the table below. Although this shows that the measures are significantly 
different, the case study sample is limited to political news stories only. The case study results are 
not appropriate for analysing empirical data, but rather to guide discussion.!
! Graph 6.1 shows that the trends for MS2, MS3 and MS4 (representing the share of news 
subjects in political stories, shown in the occupation of politician and shown as experts that are 
women respectively) are positive over the ten election period (t). This suggests that these three 
indicators show a decrease in media sexism at a much greater slope than the increase in share of 
women candidates in the ten election timeframe (t+1). Graph 6.2 shows that the trends for MS5, 
MS6 and MS7 (whether women news subjects are identified more by family status than men, more 
likely to be shown in photographs while men are not and whether stories are more reinforcing of 
MS2 MS3 MS4 MS5 MS6 MS7
Case study 34.45% 32.17% 32.38% 5.11% 0 13.41%
GMMP 30% 19% 24% 11% 1 56%
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Graph 6.1: MS2 (% news subjects in political stories women), MS3 (% news subjects portrayed 

















Graph 6.2: MS5 (% news subjects family female — male), MS6 (dummy: women more likely in 

















Graph 6.3: MSB (% passive news subjects female — male), MSC (% women politician news 
subjects ‘novelty’), MSD (% news subjects focus on appearance female — male)

















Graph 6.4: MSE (% ads specific female news subjects — male), MSF (face-to-body ratio female 
































Graph 6.6: MSJ (% politician news subjects first name female — male), MSK (% politician news 
subjects viability questioned female — male)
gender stereotypes than challenging of them respectively) are all decreasing in the time period, 
also suggesting lower media sexism over time.!
! Graph 6.3 shows negative trends for MSB, MSC and MSD (whether women are shown 
more passively; if they are shown as novelties; if their appearance is focused on more). Graph 6.4 
shows positive trends for MSE and MSG (political ads showing women minus men; women 
candidates on the front page minus men) but a slightly negative trend for MSF (face-to-body ratios 
women minus men). Graph 6.5 shows positive trends for MSH and MSI (women’s issues being the 
focus when discussing women candidates; share of female reporters). Graph 6.6 shows negative 
trends for MSJ and MSK (first name used women minus men; impact and/or viability questioned). 
Therefore, all graphs show a decrease in media sexism over time, in all indicators except MSF; 
i.e., media sexism only increased in that women’s bodies became more focused on with time while 
men’s did not. Although Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed or truly tested against the data 
collected, it cannot be rejected either. As media sexism decreased over time, the share of women 
candidates shows a slight upward trend.!
! However, the sample is ripe with overtly sexist media throughout the ten election periods, 
suggesting that the measures have not been effective in capturing tones, language and other 
aspects of media sexism. For example, two weeks before the 2010 election, there is an interview 
with Centre party leader Maud Olofsson. The headline is a quote from the interview: “My first love 
was a mommas boy”, and the caption underneath reads “Somewhere around the middle of the 
interview it happens. Suddenly the tears come. Minister of Enterprise and Innovation Maud 
Olofsson cannot keep her feelings in check when her grandmother is brought up. ‘Grandmother 
taught me to NEVER let a man control me’” (Aftonbladet archives, 5 September 2010, p.22-23 of 
the sunday extra paper, [self-translation]). Of course, male politicians have interviews with the 
purpose of understanding their personal attributes as well, but it seems unlikely that Fredrik 
Reinfeldt would have such intimate and emotional questions focused on. In fact, the same day (p.
20-21 of the normal issue) the caption for a similar story about Reinfeldt and Mona Sahlin give the 
following headlines: “She: likes to hang out with her girlfriends”, “He: loves hot dogs in all forms”. 
Perhaps more nuance would have been detected with measures targeting language and themes.!
! Had the case study been collected for time periods before 1979, perhaps more variation in 
the share of women candidates would have been seen. However, some variation — including the 
first case of a decrease in women’s representation since 1928 (Freidenvall, 2013, p.97) — does 
occur in the time period selected. Similarly, as has been noted, political media is the most gender 
neutral in Sweden, and Sweden has among the most gender neutral media in the world. Therefore, 
the sample in the case study was tough. The fact that no definitive correlations in variation (instead 
of only the overall trend) can be seen in the graphs does not mean that media sexism and the 
share of women candidates do not have a longitudinal relationship, but this case study alone 
certainly does not provide strong enough evidence.!!
6.6: Summary of results!
Overall, the research question — whether there is a link between media sexism and the share of 
women candidates — has been answered in the affirmative, though more research must be 
conducted. The analysis in certain regards has posed more questions than answered. Will the 
relationships seen strengthen or weaken with a larger set of observations? What is the impact of 
corruption on women’s political ambition, and could this interplay with media sexism? Would the 
relationships found in the regressions hold up in the long term, and with other media sexism 
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indicators not explored in this study? How can distinctions between production and reproduction 
effects of media sexism aid in confirming or contradicting the results?!
! The empirical analysis yielded results in support of Hypotheses 1: the basic, non-interaction 
OLS regression showed a relationship between media sexism and the share of women candidates 
in one of the media sexism indicators. The evidence for Hypotheses 2 and 3 was not conclusive, 
even if the results could be understood theoretically to showcase that women's rights and 
development levels being high means that women cannot be misrepresented, and being low 
means that women cannot be underrepresented, in media if women’s political ambition is to be 
spurred on. The null hypothesis could, however, definitively be rejected as all three sets of models 
showed at least one media sexism indicator to be significantly correlated with the share of women 
candidates.!
! Meanwhile, the case study could not provide strong evidence for Hypothesis 4, but did 
provide a basis for the importance of a longitudinal study of media sexism’s impact on women’s 
political ambition, both on a case study and comparative level. The overall trends of media sexism 
measured did have the appropriate direction relative to the increase in women candidates, but 
there was not enough variation nor was the time span long enough to give any meaningful 
empirical evidence. 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7: Conclusion!
“What is presented in the mass media progressively and rapidly 
transforms into the truth … it morphs into the ‘reality’ around us, even 
when this ‘reality’ is far removed from our daily lives … Given the role 
of gender-unfair, gender-imbalanced news as a constitutive element 
in the maintenance and reinforcement of a social imaginary that 
excludes, discriminates against and subordinates women, we will 
subsequently, also to an equal measure, adopt behaviours, actions 
and attitudes that exclude, discriminate and subordinate.” (GMMP, 
2010, p.37)!!
To investigate media sexism and women’s political ambition is to deal with a perturbing truth about 
democracies worldwide: gender equality in political representation cannot be achieved through 
changing policy without also changing mindsets. In order to best serve the interests of peoples in a 
democracy, these peoples must be represented (Fox and Lawless, 2005). Any factor reducing 
women’s representation, both in media and politics, must be understood in order to aid in bringing 
about positive change in democracies. Women have been legally allowed into the political sphere 
but are still shut out from, and considered less valuable within, it. This paradox may be fuelled by 
the incessant reiterations of sexism found in media.!
! The results of this cross-sectional study answer the research question in support of the 
claim that media sexism has a negative relationship with women candidates using indicators 
gauging what share of experts in the news are women and whether women are more likely to be 
shown in photographs while men are not, holding up to national controls. Significant models were 
seen both without interactions and when testing interactions between media sexism and women’s 
rights, and media sexism and development. This study has been the first cross-sectional study to 
problematise media sexism as one factor explaining the persistence of low women’s political 
ambition. The diagram below sums up the basic cycle; the results and theory laid out by this study 
help to explain how sexism, portrayed through media and produced by media, can lead to lower 
levels of women’s political ambition. The rest of the cycle needs to be extrapolated on in future 
research to understand the full story.!















! At a glance, progress seems to be had in terms of reaching gender equality in politics, but 
there are several instances where the opposite can be said. Guinea-Bissau went from 20% women 
in parliament in 1988 to 10% in 2010 (EU EOM, 2014b, p.45) and Pakistan from 16 women 
winning general seats in 2008 to 6 in 2013 (EU EOM, 2013a, p.45). In the 2006 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina parliamentary election, women were placed high up on party lists because of an 
adherence to new electoral quotas, yet women received only half the number of seats as in the 
previous election largely because they were given no space in election campaign media (OSCE, 
2007). Tokenism is defined as “a subgroup making up less than 15% of the whole group” (Towns, 
2003, p.7) — for democratically elected lower houses of parliament then, women are still tokens in 
37% of countries as of 2016 (IPU, 2016). This study has taken this unsettling phenomenon as a 
point of departure, and the results support the claim that media sexism, portraying sexism in 
society and directly adding to sexism in society, could contribute by reducing the supply of eligible 
female candidates.!
! Despite gains in gender equality officially, social norms play a role in keeping women’s 
political representation low. “There is currently a lack of empirical research on how signals from 
institutions other than political parties may constitute a hindrance for the advancement of women to 
political posts.” (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014, p.3). Fox and Lawless (2004) point out the lack 
of explanations for what brings about women’s lower self-perceived qualification and why they are 
less likely to be encouraged to enter politics (the two strongest factors explaining women’s political 
ambition in their survey results). The results of this study suggest that one explanation is media 
sexism.!
! This study has argued that media sexism, both by producing and reproducing sexism in 
society, is a hindrance to women’s political representation because the bystander effect ensures 
that women consuming media in societies across the world see themselves as less suitable for 
politics. Portraying women politicians and candidates, and indeed women in general in the news, in 
a way that gives them less agency, less credibility or simply less space ensures that women 
considering candidacy must also consider if they are willing to break a norm that officially has 
already been altered to include them.!!
7.1: Recommendations for future research!
Media sexism is a global issue, and its consequences need to be more fully delved into. This study 
found evidence for a negative relationship between media sexism and women’s political ambition. 
However, many questions remain unanswered — such as whether the relationship holds up over 
the long term. Media sexism comes in many shapes and sizes that have not been explored 
sufficiently. Specifically, this study leaves the following recommendations.!
! The most important is continued efforts to understand what aspects of media sexism 
specifically influence women’s political ambition. Certain studies have looked into how media 
portrays men and women differently when covering scandals (Larris and Maggio, 2012; 
Bromander, 2012), or found results that suggest political polls in media systematically underrate 
women (Stout and Kline, 2011). Specific measures depending on the type of media medium may 
be necessary because of differences in how women are portrayed in for example cyber media, 
video games and TV (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015) — measures such as women being 
interrupted more often than men in TV news can be compared cross-nationally, even if it is not 
comparable across other types of media. Media sexism can be operationalised partially as the 
gender composition of the newsrooms and other media leadership (Edström and Mølster, 2014). 
As mentioned, the tone and language of media may reveal more nuance of media sexism.!
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! Although the cross-sectional design gave great insights in this study, future research needs 
to investigate thoroughly how media sexism impacts women’s political ambition in panel data. This 
could also help to establish causality, and to determine whether the cycle laid out in the diagram 
above can be tested empirically. However, there are more insights to be gleamed from further 
investigation cross-sectionally, and on the sub-national level. This is because of the inability of the 
present study to incorporate several interesting control variables.!
! National level control variables that need to be included in future research are, most 
importantly, electoral gender quotas and attitudes towards women politicians. For this study, 
variables measuring these factors greatly reduced the already low number of observations and 
therefore could not be included. However, the World Values Survey variable on whether men make 
better political leaders than women do and the Atlas of Electoral Gender Quotas data could add to 
future research by showing how media sexism varies with public opinion of women politicians as 
well as how women candidates are promoted by quotas.!
! Additionally, different levels and stages of democracy could interplay in the relationship 
(Dahlerup et al., 2013; Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover; 2009). Gender empowerment indices, as 
previously used to understand national-level sexism and gender gaps in educational attainment 
(Sibley et al., 2007) could also prove influential in understanding women’s political ambition and 
therefore alter the impact media sexism has on ambition. How long women have been legally able 
to stand for elections could be an influential factor to include. Finally, the possibility of 
intersectionality between media sexism, racism, ageism, homophobia and more mean that the 
results found in this study could be extrapolated upon to understand the multiplicative effect of 
biased media on candidates with intersecting characteristics that are historically discriminated 
against in politics.!
! On the sub-national level, the most important consideration is party politics. How parties 
vary on the left-right scale according to female participation and gender quotas (Dahlerup et al., 
2013) and how party identification influences gender group voting (Winfrey et al., 2014) are 
interesting considerations for comparing how media stands up against party identification as an 
explanation for lower female representation and potentially lower women’s ambition.!!
7.2: Policy implications!
As media sexism has been shown in this study to have a negative relationship with women’s 
political ambition, it is important to consider what various actors can do to reduce media sexism 
and the impact it has. Media institutions can improve from within, but advocacy and lobbying from 
outside of media is an important motivator (GMMP, 2010).!
! The most obvious policy implication is to continue using legislation that improves the 
chances women have of being elected, and that ensures they have equal power as male 
representatives. The results of this study show that more women in parliament encourage more 
candidates to step forward, which can circumvent the negative impact of media sexism. Overtime, 
assuming that the production of sexism by media (portraying sexism regardless of actual level of 
sexism in society) does not increase, having a more gender equal distribution of power within 
politics and all areas of public life will decrease the reproduction of sexism by media (mirroring the 
sexism in society). However, men must also take on the challenge of being partners in this effort. 
“It would be impossible to envisage or discuss, let alone adopt, quotas to enhance women’s 
participation in politics without [men].” (Dahlerup et al., 2013, p.36).!
! However, policy intervention into the content of media or elections is a sensitive issue. 
People generally are reluctant to accept affirmative action policies (Fraser et al., 2015; Swim et al., 
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1995). Likewise, even in Sweden, a country known to make strong efforts towards gender equality, 
politicians are reluctant to promote any policy involving media that could be considered a breach of 
freedom of speech, even if quotas on gender content of media have had some success in certain 
contexts (Edström and Mølster, 2014). Government intervention in media to reduce sexism would 
have difficulty in justifying itself. Therefore, it is important for other actors to get involved to take a 
bottom-up approach to decreasing media sexism.!
! Firstly, women’s networks and media ‘watchdog’ organisations can be extremely efficient in 
reducing media sexism. For example, the KVINFO network in Denmark gathers information 
regarding women experts in a wide range of areas, and is a resource for media when an expert is 
needed (Edström and Mølster, 2014). Rättvisaren (2015) is a Swedish organisation that monitors 
media content across the country and offers their services to journalists and newsrooms on ways 
to be more inclusive and less stereotypical for gender and race as well as providing an expert list. 
In America, Name it Change it works to “identify, prevent, and end sexist media coverage of federal 
and gubernatorial women candidates, elected politicians, and high-profile public officials of all 
races. We monitor coverage by all members of the press—from bloggers to radio hosts to 
television pundits” (Larris and Maggio, 2012, p.1), and teaches media outlets about reversibility (if 
they would not say it about men, they should not say it about women) and parallelism (if they 
would not depict other discriminated groups in this manner, they should not depict women in this 
manner) among other things (p.3-5).!
! Secondly, and more importantly, media needs to change from within. Even if media cannot 
be expected to reduce their role in reproducing sexism that already exists in society, media can 
and should take responsibility for reducing their role in producing sexism. The simplest way to do 
this is to use the services offered by organisations such as those named above. Media actors can 
also create their own realistic goals if they focus on counting: by measuring gender composition of 
stories, experts and more, over the long term this can reduce gender differences in how men and 
women are represented as well (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015). Improving the gender 
composition of newsrooms and media boardrooms can also over time improve gender neutrality of 
news output (Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009). Often, media will give the excuse that 
following the recession, as well as generally during a trend towards social media and away from 
traditional media, gender goals cannot be achieved while focusing on keeping reader/viewership 
high, but this has been shown to be incorrect in several settings (Edström and Mølster, 2014).!!
7.3: Final remarks!
In their Citizen Political Ambition survey data, Fox and Lawless (2004) found that young women 
showed more interest in politics but young men were more engaged in activities that were likely to 
lead them to campaigning themselves later on (p.268). They find that self-perceived qualification to 
run and encouragement to run are the most important considerations for women running (p.273) — 
media could give that encouragement or do the opposite. It may be that the normalisation of media 
sexism, and the continued lack of voice women are given, contributes to disturbing developments 
such as that in France, where even the highly successful current head of the IMF, Christine 
Lagarde, has joined forces with French women politicians from all parties to fight the rampant, 
sometimes violent sexism that continues to be commonplace within the confines of the French 
parliament (Willsher, 2016). However, perhaps this should be seen as a representation of the 
power women have to fight against sexism. “Our research shows the sexist attack doesn’t have to 
be egregious to have a negative impact. But calling attention to the sexism does have an impact—
a positive one.” (Larris and Maggio, 2012, p.13). 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Appendix 1: Additional information regarding share of 
women candidates!!
The following table describes the six unusual observations in the Share of Women Candidates 
variable that were included in the sample.!
!
Furthermore, the Share of Women Candidates variable was mainly gathered from the IPU 
PARLINE (2016) data. However, in order to increase the number of observations, efforts were 
made to find the candidate gender breakdown for countries where IPU only provided the gender 
breakdown of those winning seats, not candidates. The following table includes all countries where 
candidate gender breakdown was gathered from a source other than IPU, the name of the source 
as can be found in the bibliography and what kind of source it is.!!
Country Year Irregularity
Austria 2013 Source for candidate breakdown gives different overall number of candidates than 
IPU; however, a pilot test for a new system of running was used as well as the 
normal system in this election. The candidate share is therefore in reference to the 
normal system only, not the pilot system (Meinparlament.at, 2013).
Brazil 2014 Number of candidates by gender not separated by chamber, but both chambers 
elected directly and therefore not considered an issue (TSE, 2014).
Greece 2015 Two elections in 2015; candidate breakdown uses January election, not June (IPU 
PARLINE, 2016).
Guinea 2013 Auxiliary/reserve candidates explicitly included in gender breakdown (EU EOM, 
2013c).
Paraguay 2013 Number of candidates by gender not separated by chamber, but both chambers 
elected directly and therefore not considered an issue (EU EOM, 2013b).
Romania 2012 Number of candidates by gender not separated by chamber, but both chambers 
elected directly and therefore not considered an issue (Permanent Electoral 
Authority, 2013; UNDP, 2013).
Country Source name Source type
Afghanistan OSCE, 2010e Election observation report
Albania OSCE, 2013a Election observation report
Antigua and Barbuda The Commonwealth, 2014 Election observation report
Australia AEC, 2016 Electoral Commission website
Austria Meinparlament.at, 2013 Parliamentary website
Belarus OSCE, 2012a Election observation report
Bosnia and Herzegovina OSCE, 2015a Election observation report
Brazil TSE, 2014 Superior Electoral Court website
Ecuador CNE, 2016 National Electoral Council website
Georgia OSCE, 2012b Election observation report
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!!!
Guinea EU EOM, 2013c Election observation report
Malta OSCE, 2013b Election observation report
Mozambique EU EOM, 2014a Election observation report
New Zealand Electoral Commission, 2014 Electoral Commission website
Pakistan EU EOM, 2013a Election observation report
Paraguay EU EOM, 2013b Election observation report
Romania Permanent Electoral Authority, 2013 Elecoral Authority report
Trinidad and Tobago Commonwealth Observer Group, 2015 Election observation report
Turkmenistan OSCE, 2014a Election observation report
Ukraine Women’s Consortium of Ukraine, 2014 Women’s network NGO report
UK Hawkins et al., 2015 Government briefing paper
USA CAWP, 2014; FEC, 2015 Federal Electoral Commission 
website and Center for American 
Women and Politics website
Source name Source typeCountry
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Appendix 2: Coding rules for media sexism variables in 
case study!!
As explained in the Methodology, the media sexism indicators that correspond to those produced 
by GMMP are coded according to the same rules as in the GMMP guidelines (GMMP, 2015b). The 
additional ten media sexism variables were collected according to the following guidelines.!
Variable Description and coding rules (NS=news subject)
MSB The difference between the share of women NS that are shown in a passive 
rather than active role minus male!
Active: events/ideas described occur at least partially by this NS; the NS is quoted!
Passive: events/ideas described occur only to this NS, or the NS is mentioned outside 
of any event/main idea
MSC The share of female candidates or politicians presented as novelties!
At least one mention is made to the candidates gender where it is (subjectively) not 
relevant and/or the candidate is presented as a token rather than a serious contender.
MSD The difference between the share of female NS whose appearance is focused on 
minus male!
If the appearance (attractiveness, dress, etc and/or physical descriptions of for 
example looking tired) are given more than one reference.
MSE The difference between the share of political advertisements showing specific 
female NS minus male!
Ads are considered to show one or several NS if it features the photo and/or name of 
a person (candidate or otherwise); cartoons are not included as photos
MSF The difference between the face-to-body ratio of women photographed minus 
men!
Face-to-body ratio=(total distance from top of head to bottom of chin)/(total distance 
form top of head to lowest shown part of body in photograph)!
Distance is measured in one straight line roughly following the angle of the head. As 
guided by literature, very awkwardly posed photographs or misleading face-to-body 
ratios (for example, the whole body is showing but the person is lying down or the 
person is photographed from behind) are excluded from the calculations entirely.
MSG The difference between the number of female NS in the occupation of politician 
shown on the front page minus male!
Shown: in photographs and/or referenced by name
MSH The share of female candidates or politicians discussed mainly or only in 
reference to women’s issues!
Women’s issues/policies explained in literature review and methodology; if all or 
almost all mentions of the NS in the story are in reference to these.
MSI The share of female reporters!
Including stories where writer of news story is not a journalist.
MSJ The difference between the share of female NS in the occupation of politician 
referenced by first name when their full name or title is not given minus male!
If first name is used alone in even one reference, the NS is included in coding of 
referenced by first name.
MSK The difference between the share of women NS in the occupation of politician 
whose potential impact or viability in politics is questioned minus male!
Coded as questioned if their potential impact is brought into question (if elected, would 
they be able to get anything done?) or their viability (are they suited for politics?).
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Appendix 3: Robustness models with alternative control 
variables!!
As the cases included in the models are low, at 58 observations, the models are not able to include 
all interesting control variables. A standard robustness check with a different measure of the 
independent variable, media sexism, is not possible, since the GMMP data is the only global media 
sexism data found. However, as an alternative robustness check for the significance of the 
independent variable, the models in Set A are repeated with a different set of variables that the 
literature suggest are important. Electoral system and share of women in the lower house are still 
included in the models; however, corruption, HDI, women’s rights and media access are 
exchanged for other control variables. The table below presents the controls that are used in these 
new models, as well as literature suggesting their importance and the source they are taken from.!!
! With these controls, once again only MS4 (% expert news subjects that are female) retains 
significance throughout all models, i.e. with all controls added (although the next appendix, 
Appendix 4, shows the insignificant models for the media sexism indicators that did not retain 
significance when all controls were added, the ‘robustness’ models that were insignificant are not 
included there).!
! The results for the significant set of models will only briefly be discussed. With this set of 
control variables, the number of observations is reduced to only 54; additionally to the fact that the 
control variables in Sets A, B and C being considered the most valuable, the fact that the controls 
used in the ‘robustness’ models give a lower number of observations is another reason for not 
using them in the main analysis. The OLS checks show that Pakistan is an outlier, but the models 
are not significantly different with and without Pakistan (other than electoral system losing 
significance in the final model when Pakistan is excluded), and therefore the model with Pakistan 
is presented. The other OLS checks show no issues. !
! As can be seen by the fact that MS4, and only MS4, is significant with all controls suggests 
that even with a different, relevant set of control variables, media sexism has a relationship with the 
share of women candidates. Of the new control variables, only religion is significant, and 
surprisingly considering the predictions in the literature, has an overall positive relationship with the 
share of women candidates. In the bivariate model, the R2 value is very low, only 0.082 — less 
than half of what it is in the bivariate model in Set A, 0.198. This may suggest that in future studies, 
with a much higher number of observations, media sexism indicators may be able to explain much 
Variable Literature Source and variable scale
Religion (Catholicism 
and Islam)
Inglehart and Norris, 
2003
Variable for % pop. Catholic or Muslim, created out 
of two variables (% of pop. Catholic plus % of pop. 
Muslim) from QoG dataset (La Porta et al., 1999)
Women’s education Koch, 1999; Konrath et 
al., 2012; Brandt, 2011
Average years of women’s education as of 2010, 
taken from the QoG dataset (Barro and Lee, 2013)
Nordic region Dahlerup et al, 2013; 
Wängnerud, 2009
A dummy is created where Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, Iceland and Finland are given a coding of 1
Women's political 
rights
(see discussion of 
women’s rights variable 
in Methodology)
Political component of women’s rights variable 
created; this is the 3 category variable for women’s 
political rights from QoG (Cingranelli and Richards, 
2010)
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higher levels of variation in the share of women candidates. Overall, the models in the ‘robustness’ 
check suggest that future research with better media sexism indicators will find that this study has 
not been able to fully showcase the impact media sexism has on the share of women candidates.!!!
Robustness models: MS4 with different controls
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6 7
MS4 (expert) 0.335* 0.272* 0.265* 0.253* 0.240* 0.247* 0.240*
(0.156) (0.110) (0.108) (0.102) (0.105) (0.106) (0.108)
Women in lower 
house
0.787*** 0.707*** 0.772*** 0.745*** 0.791*** 0.820***
(0.107) (0.115) (0.111) (0.119) (0.135) (0.154)
Electoral system -4.631* -4.512* -4.501* -4.819* -4.778*
(2.647) (2.501) (2.516) (2.564) (2.589)
Religion 0.091* 0.095** 0.085* 0.088*











Constant 18.590*** 4.137 8.386* 3.152 1.391 1.423 3.718
(3.924) (3.395) (4.120) (4.366) (5.169) (5.194) (7.834)
R2 0.082 0.553 0.579 0.632 0.635 0.639 0.640
N 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Appendix 4: Models with insignificant media sexism 
indicators!!
The first model shown is the full set of models that represent the Table 6.3 models with the outlier 
Tunisia not excluded. Certain media sexism indicators in models in Sets B and C showed outliers, 
and are therefore presented both with and without outliers included in the models.!
Table 6.3: MS6 Women’s rights interaction— with outlier Tunisia
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS6 (photo) 6.429 6.656* 4.316 3.473 3.820 4.392
(4.123) (3.672) (3.337) (3.436) (3.531) (3.477)
Women's rights 
dummy
19.065*** 10.278* 9.078* 6.552 6.598 6.074
(4.312) (4.457) (3.994) (4.697) (4.733) (4.650)
MS6_rights -13.845* -11.934* -9.292* -8.991* -9.038* -10.882*
(5.757) (5.150) (4.653) (4.660) (4.696) (4.725)
Women in lower 
house
0.543*** 0.421** 0.401** 0.429** 0.386**
(0.140) (0.129) (0.130) (0.143) (0.142)
Electoral system -9.058*** -8.911*** -8.846** -7.587**
(2.386) (2.389) (2.410) (2.472)








Constant 16.571*** 9.809** 17.800*** 22.320*** 30.598* 23.466
(2.861) (3.085) (3.468) (5.624) (17.480) (17.625)
R2 0.286 0.444 0.563 0.573 0.576 0.600
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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!!!
Set A, MS1
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6 7
MS1 0.274* 0.159 0.128 0.095 0.106 0.104 0.103
(0.150) (0.123) (0.110) (0.112) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116)
Women in lower 
house
0.633*** 0.513*** 0.435** 0.466** 0.476** 0.444**
(0.114) (0.106) (0.120) (0.144) (0.146) (0.148)
Electoral system -9.484*** -9.311*** -9.280*** -9.256*** -8.534**
(2.395) (2.381) (2.401) (2.419) (2.485)
HDI (logged) 6.907 8.801 10.713 7.086
(5.171) (7.011) (8.022) (8.557)









Constant 19.372*** 9.563** 17.372*** 22.029*** 23.929** 32.164* 27.007
(3.790) (3.538) (3.711) (5.072) (6.946) (17.821) (18.277)
R2 0.056 0.394 0.530 0.546 0.547 0.549 0.562
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
   of  55 77
!Set A, MS2
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6 7
MS2 0.060 -0.060 -0.024 -0.051 -0.050 -0.043 -0.039
(0.110) (0.090) (0.080) (0.081) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086)
Women in lower 
house
0.676*** 0.539*** 0.446** 0.450** 0.459** 0.427**
(0.117) (0.110) (0.122) (0.143) (0.086) (0.148)
Electoral system -9.601*** -9.230*** -9.232*** -9.236*** -8.535**
(2.432) (2.405) (2.428) (2.447) (2.512)
HDI (logged) 8.553 8.811 10.440 6.885
(5.168) (7.043) (8.107) (8.634)









Constant 24.599*** 13.426*** 20.289*** 25.446*** 25.726*** 32.688* 27.713
(2.524) (2.790) (3.029) (4.312) (6.725) (18.051) (18.486)
R2 0.005 0.381 0.519 0.543 0.543 0.545 0.557
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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!!
Set A, MS3
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6 7
MS3 0.185* 0.052 0.053 0.038 0.042 0.046 0.036
(0.108) (0.092) (0.081) (0.081) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084)
Women in lower 
house
0.640*** 0.512*** 0.427** 0.447** 0.458** 0.428**
(0.118) (0.109) (0.123) (0.144) (0.146) (0.148)
Electoral system -9.689*** -9.441*** -9.430*** -9.401*** -8.697**
(2.409) (2.389) (2.410) (2.426) (2.497)
HDI (logged) 7.586 8.951 11.160 7.574
(5.107) (7.054) (8.078) (8.652)









Constant 22.411*** 12.175*** 19.512*** 24.023*** 25.488*** 34.906* 29.747
(2.473) (2.766) (3.054) (4.283) (6.736) (17.775) (18.297)
R2 0.050 0.379 0.522 0.541 0.542 0.545 0.557
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set A, MS5
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6 7
MS5 0.082 0.100 0.130* 0.120* 0.119* 0.118* 0.111
(0.097) (0.077) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
Women in lower 
house
0.663*** 0.532*** 0.450*** 0.461** 0.470** 0.442**
(0.113) (0.103) (0.118) (0.140) (0.142) (0.145)
Electoral system -10.155*** -9.894*** -9.886*** -9.857*** -9.197***
(2.351) (2.340) (2.362) (2.380) (2.459)
HDI (logged) 6.847 7.546 9.442 6.354
(4.967) (6.905) (7.897) (8.420)









Constant 24.459*** 11.167*** 18.403*** 22.471*** 23.237** 31.355* 26.997
(2.142) (2.821) (2.972) (4.171) (6.695) (17.376) (17.849)
R2 0.013 0.394 0.550 0.566 0.566 0.568 0.577
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set A, MS6
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6 7
MS6 1.204 1.115 0.112 -1.256 -1.258 -0.961 -1.265
(3.293) (2.625) (2.343) (2.454) (2.477) (2.604) (2.603)
Women in lower 
house
0.657*** 0.530*** 0.424** 0.439** 0.450** 0.413**
(0.114) (0.106) (0.123) (0.146) (0.150) (0.152)
Electoral system -9.671*** -9.538*** -9.529*** -9.481*** -8.752**
(2.433) (2.397) (2.420) (2.442) (2.502)
HDI (logged) 8.821 9.784 11.166 7.461
(5.388) (7.294) (8.115) (8.620)









Constant 24.960*** 12.097*** 19.998*** 25.948*** 27.001*** 33.571* 27.901
(2.484) (2.984) (3.312) (4.883) (7.248) (17.886) (18.386)
R2 0.002 0.378 0.519 0.542 0.542 0.544 0.557
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set A, MS7
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6 7
MS7 0.040 0.045 0.038 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.037
(0.042) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Women in lower 
house
0.662*** 0.537*** 0.437** 0.451** 0.460** 0.433**
(0.112) (0.105) (0.119) (0.141) (0.144) (0.146)
Electoral system -9.489*** -9.198*** -9.190*** -9.166*** -8.559**
(2.387) (2.353) (2.376) (2.393) (2.464)
HDI (logged) 8.414* 9.282 11.179 7.993
(4.996) (6.941) (7.935) (8.514)









Constant 23.683*** 10.386** 17.962*** 22.591*** 23.544** 31.719* 27.462
(2.629) (3.068) (3.324) (4.270) (6.780) (17.561) (18.032)
R2 0.016 0.396 0.533 0.557 0.557 0.559 0.568
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set B, MS1
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS1 0.234 0.142 0.153 0.148 0.138 0.127
(0.221) (0.198) (0.175) (0.175) (0.177) (0.177)
Women's rights 
dummy
15.159* 2.630 5.015 2.728 2.091 0.364
(7.267) (7.204) (6.399) (6.819) (6.965) (7.104)
MS1_rights -0.214 -0.014 -0.098 -0.100 -0.074 -0.049
(0.295) (0.267) (0.237) (0.237) (0.244) (0.244)
Women in lower 
house
0.574*** 0.434** 0.419** 0.450** 0.430**
(0.146) (0.134) (0.135) (0.148) (0.148)
Electoral system -9.644*** -9.541*** -9.353*** -8.544**
(2.429) (2.441) (2.461) (2.553)








Constant 15.154** 9.891* 17.125*** 20.994** 30.710 26.928
(4.764) (4.441) (4.329) (5.877) (18.748) (18.977)
R2 0.225 0.399 0.539 0.547 0.550 0.562
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set B, MS2
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS2 -0.225 -0.240 -0.182 -0.192 -0.180 -0.186
(0.226) (0.200) (0.178) (0.178) (0.184) (0.183)
Women's rights 
dummy
10.406* 2.021 2.035 -0.770 -0.779 -2.421
(4.791) (4.728) (4.200) (4.964) (5.009) (5.181)
MS2_rights 0.150 0.179 0.154 0.168 0.163 0.185
(0.257) (0.227) (0.202) (0.202) (0.205) (0.205)
Women in lower 
house
0.571*** 0.444** 0.428** 0.444** 0.421**
(0.143) (0.131) (0.132) (0.142) (0.143)
Electoral system -9.447*** -9.193*** -9.200*** -8.420**
(2.424) (2.434) (2.456) (2.534)








Constant 22.182*** 15.361*** 21.871*** 26.051*** 31.245* 27.423
(3.309) (3.388) (3.442) (5.241) (18.377) (18.592)
R2 0.228 0.407 0.541 0.551 0.552 0.564
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set B, MS3 — outlier (Zimbabwe) included
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS3 0.335 0.255 0.231 0.235 0.232 0.183
(0.223) (0.200) (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.190)
Women's rights 
dummy
15.828** 7.342 7.015 4.408 4.154 2.534
(4.748) (4.780) (4.218) (4.913) (4.980) (5.435)
MS3_rights -0.369 -0.292 -0.261 -0.258 -0.246 -0.188
(0.254) (0.227) (0.201) (0.201) (0.204) (0.218)
Women in lower 
house
0.551*** 0.423** 0.408** 0.432** 0.420**
(0.144) (0.131) (0.131) (0.142) (0.143)
Electoral system -9.597*** -9.351*** -9.323*** -8.797**
(2.394) (2.404) (2.423) (2.530)








Constant 15.794*** 9.970** 17.503*** 21.422*** 29.788 27.807
(3.339) (3.344) (3.498) (5.159) (18.274) (18.535)
R2 0.241 0.407 0.547 0.556 0.558 0.563
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set B, MS3 — outlier (Zimbabwe) excluded
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS3 0.440* 0.350* 0.347* 0.363* 0.360* 0.316*
(0.224) (0.201) (0.171) (0.169) (0.171) (0.182)
Women's rights 
dummy
17.866*** 9.426* 9.578* 6.091 5.934 4.460
(4.740) (4.780) (4.064) (4.586) (4.659) (5.088)
MS3_rights -0.474* -0.387* -0.377* -0.383* -0.375* -0.322
(0.253) (0.227) (0.193) (0.190) (0.194) (0.208)
Women in lower 
house
0.533*** 0.390** 0.365** 0.379** 0.368**
(0.140) (0.123) (0.123) (0.133) (0.208)
Electoral system -10.366*** -10.081*** -10.060*** -9.580***
(2.264) (2.240) (2.262) (2.363)








Constant 13.756*** 8.366* 16.115*** 21.562*** 26.312 24.546
(3.413) (3.362) (3.321) (4.781) (16.999) (17.244)
R2 0.284 0.440 0.603 0.622 0.622 0.626
N 57 57 57 57 57 57
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set B, MS5
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS5 0.135 0.119 0.120 0.104 0.101 0.103
(0.107) (0.095) (0.082) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086)
Women's rights 
dummy
12.884** 4.176 2.991 0.818 0.714 0.337
(3.932) (4.116) (3.575) (4.596) (4.632) (4.664)
MS5_rights -0.109 -0.049 0.040 0.060 0.066 0.036
(0.185) (0.165) (0.144) (0.147) (0.148) (0.153)
Women in lower 
house
0.569*** 0.437** 0.427** 0.454** 0.434**
(0.143) (0.128) (0.129) (0.139) (0.141)
Electoral system -10.296*** -10.124*** -10.095*** -9.402**
(2.383) (2.403) (2.420) (2.555)








Constant 17.606*** 10.881*** 18.583*** 21.765*** 31.062* 27.481
(2.690) (2.924) (3.096) (5.229) (17.779) (18.299)
R2 0.232 0.408 0.564 0.569 0.572 0.578
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set B, MS7
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS7 0.042 0.059 0.044 0.043 0.046 0.038
(0.047) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039)
Women's rights 
dummy
11.407* 4.940 4.182 0.800 1.387 -0.221
(4.853) (4.557) (4.043) (5.016) (5.152) (5.405)
MS7_rights -0.004 -0.037 -0.017 -0.004 -0.015 -0.003
(0.078) (0.069) (0.061) (0.062) (0.065) (0.067)
Women in lower 
house
0.585*** 0.451** 0.431** 0.464** 0.436**
(0.143) (0.131) (0.132) (0.145) (0.148)
Electoral system -9.470*** -9.215*** -9.153*** -8.526**
(2.407) (2.411) (2.429) (2.511)








Constant 17.541*** 9.572** 17.551*** 22.081*** 31.933* 27.849
(3.203) (3.430) (3.654) (5.409) (17.977) (18.454)
R2 0.226 0.411 0.546 0.557 0.560 0.569
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set C, MS1
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS1 0.004 0.115 0.204 0.170 0.145 0.186
(0.664) (0.591) (0.526) (0.540) (0.547) (0.545)
HDI 27.415 11.599 13.183 14.690 17.496 12.220
(22.862) (20.704) (18.431) (19.124) (20.130) (20.481)
MS1_HDI 0.189 0.012 -0.156 -0.091 -0.055 -0.122
(0.963) (0.856) (0.763) (0.794) (0.803) (0.801)
Women in lower 
house
0.537*** 0.437** 0.462** 0.472** 0.437**
(0.137) (0.124) (0.146) (0.149) (0.151)
Electoral system -9.326*** -9.275*** -9.226*** -8.506**
(2.416) (2.441) (2.462) (2.518)








Constant 2.803 3.977 10.269 10.293 16.075 15.048
(15.117) (13.431) (12.065) (12.169) (17.152) (17.085)
R2 0.241 0.412 0.543 0.544 0.546 0.560
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set C, MS2
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS2 -0.258 -0.024 0.058 0.060 0.070 -0.030
(0.627) (0.558) (0.499) (0.513) (0.518) (0.522)
HDI 30.790* 17.029 14.688 14.539 17.512 9.313
(16.304) (14.817) (13.259) (14.777) (16.722) (18.001)
MS2_HDI 0.278 -0.093 -0.150 -0.154 -0.157 -0.011
(0.862) (0.768) (0.687) (0.711) (0.717) (0.725)
Women in lower 
house
0.553*** 0.448** 0.447** 0.455** 0.422**
(0.138) (0.126) (0.145) (0.148) (0.150)
Electoral system -9.233*** -9.233*** -9.226** -8.493**
(2.439) (2.463) (2.483) (2.547)








Constant 4.516 4.273 11.946 11.960 16.312 17.702
(11.104) (9.817) (9.006) (9.111) (14.414) (14.398)
R2 0.235 0.413 0.540 0.540 0.554 0.554
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set C, MS3 — outlier (Zimbabwe) included
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS3 0.274 0.438 0.643 0.641 0.639 0.541
(0.618) (0.552) (0.488) (0.497) (0.501) (0.511)
HDI 35.963* 22.163 23.944* 24.208 27.981* 20.893
(16.256) (14.905) (13.118) (14.868) (16.540) (18.013)
MS3_HDI -0.255 -0.564 -0.846 -0.841 -0.833 -0.709
(0.851) (0.762) (0.674) (0.691) (0.696) (0.707)
Women in lower 
house
0.542*** 0.440** 0.442** 0.453** 0.426**
(0.139) (0.125) (0.144) (0.146) (0.148)
Electoral system -9.741*** -9.737*** -9.688*** -9.031**
(2.398) (2.425) (2.444) (2.531)








Constant -1.468 -1.070 4.638 4.598 10.482 11.630
(11.166) (9.944) (8.859) (9.002) (14.221) (14.270)
R2 0.242 0.410 0.552 0.552 0.554 0.563
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set C, MS3 — outlier (Zimbabwe) excluded
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS3 0.666 0.784 1.110* 1.109* 1.104* 1.006*
(0.627) (0.558) (0.471) (0.481) (0.485) (0.492)
HDI 47.297** 32.806* 37.765** 37.812* 40.071* 32.900*
(16.643) (15.266) (12.801) (14.323) (15.722) (16.996)
MS3_HDI -0.767 -1.014 -1.453* -1.452* -1.442* -1.317*
(0.860) (0.767) (0.648) (0.663) (0.670) (0.678)
Women in lower 
house
0.524*** 0.406** 0.406** 0.413** 0.386**
(0.135) (0.116) (0.133) (0.135) (0.137)
Electoral system -10.796*** -10.796*** -10.756*** -10.092***
(2.230) (2.255) (2.277) (2.352)








Constant -10.110 -8.851 -4.707 -4.714 -0.949 0.196
(11.568) (10.293) (8.646) (8.778) (13.602) (13.614)
R2 0.292 0.450 0.623 0.623 0.624 0.634
N 57 57 57 57 57 57
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set C, MS4
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS4 0.753 0.890* 1.110* 1.160** 1.161* 1.115*
(0.561) (0.494) (0.425) (0.429) (0.430) (0.432)
HDI 38.692* 25.315 29.458* 22.898 27.835 22.059
(18.463) (16.554) (14.153) (16.003) (17.074) (17.938)
MS4_HDI -0.606 -0.874 -1.221* -1.262* -1.252* -1.191*
(0.843) (0.744) (0.640) (0.643) (0.644) (0.647)
Women in lower 
house
0.523*** 0.421*** 0.361** 0.374** 0.351*
(0.127) (0.111) (0.130) (0.131) (0.133)
Electoral system -9.821*** -9.896*** -9.827*** -9.249***
(2.153) (2.159) (2.167) (2.235)








Constant -8.483 -7.900 -3.145 -2.066 6.162 6.765
(11.691) (10.278) (8.832) (8.934) (13.217) (13.219)
R2 0.336 0.496 0.640 0.646 0.651 0.658
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set C, MS5
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS5 0.308 0.106 0.096 0.094 0.097 0.118
(0.390) (0.349) (0.305) (0.309) (0.311) (0.311)
HDI 38.072** 13.169 9.337 10.305 13.807 8.876
(11.045) (11.603) (10.180) (13.084) (15.037) (15.683)
MS5_HDI -0.372 -0.025 0.038 0.041 0.036 -0.008
(0.576) (0.517) (0.452) (0.457) (0.461) (0.462)
Women in lower 
house
0.552*** 0.452** 0.460** 0.469** 0.438**
(0.139) (0.123) (0.144) (0.146) (0.149)
Electoral system -9.896*** -9.886*** -9.842*** -9.159**
(2.371) (2.396) (2.416) (2.492)








Constant -2.073 4.131 13.269* 13.041* 18.176 17.814
(7.725) (7.014) (6.508) (6.840) (12.647) (12.629)
R2 0.242 0.417 0.563 0.563 0.565 0.576
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Set C, MS7
Bivariate 2 3 4 5 6
MS7 -0.061 0.016 0.037 0.041 0.048 0.022
(0.147) (0.132) (0.118) (0.122) (0.124) (0.126)
HDI 26.828* 12.865 12.111 13.935 18.127 10.415
(12.958) (12.100) (10.788) (15.064) (17.244) (18.682)
MS7_HDI 0.178 0.053 0.009 0.001 -0.009 0.025
(0.220) (0.199) (0.178) (0.184) (0.187) (0.189)
Women in lower 
house
0.528*** 0.434** 0.447** 0.459** 0.423**
(0.137) (0.124) (0.147) (0.150) (0.154)
Electoral system -9.165*** -9.157*** -9.121*** -8.474**
(2.390) (2.413) (2.432) (2.504)








Constant 3.333 3.436 10.933 10.343 15.588 16.658
(9.181) (8.183) (7.552) (8.334) (13.249) (13.269)
R2 0.267 0.428 0.554 0.554 0.557 0.567
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Appendix 5: Validity and reliability diagnostics!!
Set A, Table 6.1: Linear model without interactions!
!
Diagrams on this page:!
Top left: Scatterplot of linearity including Loess 
line.!
Top right: Scatterplot of leverage values and 
residuals (outliers have SDR values above 3 
or below -3).!
Middle left: Histogram of normality of errors.!
Middle right: Normal P-P plot to reinforce 
normality of errors.!
Bottom: Scatterplot of residuals against 
predicted values to show homoscedasticity. 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Set B, Table 6.2: (MS4 women’s rights interaction)!
!
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Set B, Table 6.3: (MS6 women’s rights interaction)!
!
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Set C, Table 6.4: (MS6 HDI interaction)
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